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 The modern concept of globalization is most characterized by the death of 
geography and the notion that the free market is an indispensible vehicle of wealth. Yet, 
in the post-9/11 context, governments around the world increasingly view security as 
trumping both trade and economics. This has led to a drive for increased border control, 
which runs counter to the very forces that propel globalization. In fact, it seems 
impossible to address demands for security and scrutiny of cross-border movements 
without major setbacks to the drumbeat of faster, cheaper, and less bureaucratic elements 
of current economic activity.1 Such duality in policy and expectations has aggravated the 
conditions for modern crime. For example, globalization has intensified the demand for 
cheap, low-skilled labor in developed nations (such as those of Western Europe), while 
current migration policies have prevented the free flow of people to fill that demand. 
Governments’ insistence on the right to determine who crosses national borders and 
under which conditions thus “provides a market for traffickers’ ‘services’ and facilitates 
their ability to engage in slavery-like abuses with virtual impunity.”2 The world’s poor 
are often left no other option than to depend on smugglers and human traffickers in order 
to leave home and seek economic opportunity. Thus, although there remains a lack of 
conclusive evidence on this point, it appears likely the opposing forces of free markets 
                                                
1 Frank P. Harvey, Smoke & Mirrors: Globalized Terrorism and the Illusion of Multilateral Security, 
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press), 2004, p. 13. 
2 Kinsey Alden Dinan, “Globalization and national sovereignty: from migration to trafficking,” Trafficking 
in Human$, Sally Cameron and Edward Newman, eds, (United Nations University Press), 2008. 
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and border security propel modern slavery. I plan to demonstrate that, in order to 
effectively combat this enormous violation of human rights in the twenty-first century, 
countries must shift away from their obsession with state security and turn toward a 
human security mindset. 
 The tensions between migratory pressures and border security have been 
exacerbated by the current structure of the European Union (EU) as well as the broader 
organization of the Schengen zone. In full force since 29 March 1995, the Schengen 
Agreement of 1985 completely opened the borders between EU member states and 
several other European countries. Yet “while the borders within Europe’s Schengen zone 
have become much more open in recent years, those at the edges of the zone have 
become more difficult to cross, leading many observers to refer to ‘Fortress Europe’.”3 
Regardless of new border controls, the ease of travel once inside the zone makes it very 
tempting for migrants to attempt illegally crossing the outer barriers. This has 
consequently created both a major fuel for human trafficking and a significant obstacle to 
the fight against organized crime in Europe. Furthermore, the unique arrangement of EU 
border security has put nations on the periphery of the Schengen zone in an uncertain 
position. Countries such as Poland, which once merely served as origin states for 
trafficking victims, have now found themselves to be the door to the EU, forcing them 
into a position of both transit and destination.  
 Before examining the specific situation of human trafficking in contemporary 
Poland as well as the European Union, it is first important to consider the universal 
                                                
3 Leslie Holmes, “Human Trafficking & Corruption: Triple Victimisation?”, Strategies Against Human 
Trafficking: The Role of the Security Sector, Cornelius Friesendorf, ed., United Nations Office on Drugs 
and Crime and the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, September 2009. 
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understanding of the modern slavery topic. In fact, human slavery is not a new 
phenomenon to the world, as demonstrated by the large number of international laws 
drafted throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries as a means of thwarting the 
problem. In 1815, the Congress of Vienna adopted an act, which included an annex 
regarding the Universal Abolition of the Slave Trade. Later, four international 
conventions were adopted with the aim of abolishing the phenomenon of white slave 
traffic: “the 1904 International Agreement for the Suppression of the White Slave Traffic, 
the 1910 International Convention for the Suppression of the White Slave Traffic, the 
1921 International Convention for the Suppression of the Traffic in Women and Children 
and, finally, the 1933 International Convention for the Suppression of the Traffic in 
Women of Full Age.”4 Next, the United Nations Convention for the Suppression of the 
Traffic in Persons and the Exploitation of the Prostitution of Others went into effect in 
1951, extending previous international conventions by using a race, gender, and age 
neutral terminology. Eventually, the UN General Assembly recognized the need for a 
Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (CTOC), which entered into force on 
29 September 2003 and was soon supplemented by the UN Protocol to Prevent, Suppress 
and Punish Trafficking in Persons, especially Women and Children on 25 December 
2003. 
 This Trafficking Protocol was designed to establish the first widespread and clear 
definition of trafficking: 
 “(a) ‘Trafficking in persons’ shall mean the recruitment, transportation, 
transfer, harbouring or receipt of persons, by means of the threat or use of 
force or other forms of coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of deception, of 
                                                
4 Silvia Scarpa, Trafficking in human beings: Modern Slavery, (New York: Oxford University Press), 2008, 
p. 50. 
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the abuse of power or of a position of vulnerability or of the giving or 
receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person 
having control over another person, for the purpose of exploitation. 
Exploitation shall include, at a minimum, the exploitation of the 
prostitution of others or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labour 
or services, slavery or practices similar to slavery, servitude or the 
removal of organs;  
 
(b) The consent of a victim of trafficking in persons to the intended 
exploitation set forth in subparagraph (a) of this article shall be irrelevant 
where any of the means set forth in subparagraph (a) have been used;  
 
(c) The recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of a 
child for the purpose of exploitation shall be considered ‘trafficking in 
persons’ even if this does not involve any of the means set forth in 
subparagraph (a) of this article;  
 
(d) ‘Child’ shall mean any person under eighteen years of age.”5 
 
In addition to this definition, the Protocol emphasizes the so-called ‘three-Ps of 
trafficking,’ which stand for the prosecution of traffickers, the protection of victims, and 
the general prevention of the crime. The Protocol attempts to spread these three Ps by 
requesting signatories (1) to adopt any legislation necessary to establish human 
trafficking as a criminal offence; (2) to protect the privacy of victims and “consider 
implementing measures to provide for the physical, psychological and social recovery of 
victims of trafficking in persons”; (3) to cooperate with states and international 
organizations in the fight against trafficking; and (4) to strengthen border controls as 
necessary to prevent trafficking in persons.6 Much of the twenty-first century literature 
and research regarding human trafficking thus has been a reaction to this Protocol’s 
structure and a review of the signatories’ methods of response. 
                                                
5 “UN Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, especially Women and Children, 
Supplementing the United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime,” United Nations, 
2000, <http://www.uncjin.org/Documents/Conventions/dcatoc/final_documents_2/convention_%20traff_ 
eng.pdf>, p. 2. 




1. Trafficking as a Criminal Offence  
 Before the passage of the UN Trafficking Protocol, many countries had weak, 
unenforced or nonexistent laws against trafficking in human beings.7 As a result, the 
penalties faced by criminals were often minor, which made trafficking both extremely 
lucrative and relatively risk-free for many criminal groups across Europe and the world. 
These circumstances were instrumental in making human trafficking today a venture 
second only to drug trafficking in the portfolio of international organized crime.8 Yet, 
even after 124 countries ratified the 2000 Protocol, little significant improvement has 
been made in reducing the horrors of modern slavery. As a result, many theories have 
arisen in the attempt to interpret this lack of progress. Firstly, many scholars suggest that 
the Protocol’s convoluted structure has not been easy to translate into standard national 
law. The result – differences in legal frameworks across jurisdictions – has consequently 
become a fundamental impediment to an effective response to trafficking, which requires 
both national and international cooperation among states, agencies, and non-
governmental organizations (NGOs).9  Secondly, recent books and articles often focus on 
the fact that many countries continue to ignore labor exploitation as a problem. Thus, 
these states have written laws solely against sex trafficking, making the prosecution of 
other traffickers extremely difficult, if not impossible. Thirdly, trafficking issues are still 
regularly approached from an illegal immigration and prostitution angle rather than an 
                                                
7 Jyothi Kanics, “Trafficking in Women,” Foreign Policy in Focus, Martha Honey and Tom Barry, eds., 
Volume 3, Number 30, October 1998. 
8 Terry Coonan and Robin Thompson, “Ancient Evil, Modern Face: The Fight Against Human 
Trafficking,” Georgetown Journal of International Affairs, Volume 6, Number 1, Winter/Spring 2005. 
9 Francesca Bosco, Vittoria Luda di Cortemiglia, and Anvar Serojitdinov, “Human Trafficking Patterns,” 
Strategies Against Human Trafficking: The Role of the Security Sector, Cornelius Friesendorf, ed., United 
Nations Office on Drugs and Crime and the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, 
September 2009, p 72.  
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illegal detention and coercion viewpoint.10 In these cases, traffickers, when prosecuted, 
are charged for their immigration violations rather than human rights abuses. Lastly, 
scholars observe that many of the nations facing the greatest amount of trafficking 
pressure (i.e. those on the borders of the EU) are post-communist states, where the rule of 
law is likely to be weak and corruption prevalent. 
 
1.1 Disparate Legal Frameworks 
 A law enforcement officer in South-East Europe is quoted as saying, “It is very 
obvious that the [human traffickers] have established a high quality of cooperation on an 
international level… The globalization of this type of crime is established. If we want to 
provide an adequate response to this challenge, we should use the same globalization 
strategy.”11 Yet globalizing the fight against modern slavery requires coherence and 
compatibility in states’ individual legislation. Nations can no longer act as autonomous 
entities; instead “they need to create horizontal policy networks that quickly and flexibly 
reach across borders.”12 This remains impossible as long as states have trouble 
deciphering the exact meaning and intentions of the UN Protocol on Trafficking. It has 
been agreed that without a universally established and clear law against trafficking, 
criminals will continue to exploit the lack of coordination within and between the nations 
in which they do business. 
 
                                                
10 Cameron, 6. 
11 Charlene Porter, European Alliance Combats Human Trafficking, Global Issues, June 2003, p. 27. 
12 Cornelius Friesendorf, ed., Strategies Against Human Trafficking: The Role of the Security Sector, 
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime and the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed 
Forces, September 2009, p 19. 
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1.2 The Ignored Issue of Labor Trafficking 
 According to the International Labor Organization (ILO), at least 2.45 million 
people worldwide find themselves in forced labor as a result of human trafficking at any 
given time. Furthermore, the ILO predicts that approximately forty-three percent of these 
people are trafficked for the purpose of commercial sexual exploitation.13 In all 
likelihood, the large remaining percentages of victims are trafficked for economic and 
labor exploitation. Thus, whereas countries of origin are often characterized by poverty 
and few prospects of economic opportunity, destination countries are often in great 
demand of sexual services and, as often ignored, cheap migrant labor. The latter is often 
forgotten in comparison to the highly publicized sex slave trade, yet it still poses a very 
large problem. Many scholars today write about such labor exploitation and the 
increasing need for improved labor movement policies that will allow not only well-
qualified migrants, but also cheap manual labor to enter wealthy, industrialized 
countries.14 They label trafficking as predominantly a labor market issue, examining the 
factors that drive demand as well as regulatory frameworks that allow trafficking to grow. 
Yet such changes seem far in the distance, as many countries continue to have no specific 
legislation on labor trafficking. “This is true despite the fact that the ILO Forced Labour 
Convention, requiring [the] criminalisation of forced labour, is one of the oldest and most 
widely ratified of ILO conventions. [Sadly,] violations of workers’ rights are [still] seen 
                                                
13 Bosco, 39. 
14 Benjamin S. Buckland, “Human Trafficking & Smuggling: Crossover & Overlap,” Strategies Against 
Human Trafficking: The Role of the Security Sector, Cornelius Friesendorf, ed., United Nations Office on 
Drugs and Crime and the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, September 2009, p 
164. 
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as matters for civil rather than criminal enforcement.”15 This latter sentiment explains a 
deep misconception that trafficking is linked to irregular migration and prostitution rather 
than labor exploitation. 
 
1.3 The Immigration Obsession 
 Governments today see the battle against illegal immigration as priority number 
one, while simultaneously trying to fight human trafficking. Thus, even after the passage 
of the UN Protocol, perpetrators of human trafficking are often charged with crimes 
related to immigration violations, reflecting the refusal of developed nation-states to 
accept the existence of a larger migratory problem caused by globalization. Also, by 
focusing on human trafficking as an issue of immigration and cross-border movement, 
states simply encourage traffickers to take their activity further underground; this often 
results in increased violence and abuse of victims rather than a decrease in their 
existence.16 Furthermore, even discovered traffickers remain in a state of relative 
impunity, as their victims are mainly illegal immigrants who are frightened of 
denouncing their captors and risking deportation.17 Thus, those traffickers who are 
convicted usually receive less than five years in jail. All of these factors help explain why 
it has remained difficult for signatories of the UN Protocol to reduce the incidence of 
trafficking. 
 
                                                
15 Allison, Jernow, “Human Trafficking, Prosecutors & Judges,” Strategies Against Human Trafficking: 
The Role of the Security Sector, Cornelius Friesendorf, ed., United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime and 
the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, September 2009, p 335.  
16 Ratna Kapur, “Migrant women and the legal politics of anti-trafficking interventions,” Trafficking in 
Human$, Sally Cameron and Edward Newman, eds., (United Nations University Press), 2008. p 115. 
17 Scarpa, 16. 
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1.4 The Role of Transition States 
 Many border states of the Schengen zone (e.g. Poland, Lithuania, Latvia, 
Slovakia) are transition countries, whose post-conflict situations provided a perfect 
environment for human trafficking growth. Their newly emerging market economies in 
the 1990s produced large rates of poverty, unemployment, and inflation, all of which 
fueled the demand for illegal immigration to the West.18 These push factors were coupled 
with the rise of facilitating gangs and criminal organizations in such post-communist 
countries. “Trafficking prospers in places where criminals can profit from the enterprise 
because laws against it are not strictly enforced.”19 Countries in the midst of political and 
economic transition generally suffer(ed) from legal and enforcement capacity gaps and 
limitations. Such absence of the rule of law fostered an atmosphere of corruption, as well.  
Fiscal problems meant that many officials in post-communist states were not paid in full 
(if at all) and as large police and state apparatuses began to downsize, many unemployed 
workers began to seek criminal gang work. Their knowledge of criminal investigations 
and current police staff were both helpful to, and desired by, these illicit organizations, 
who needed to plan effective strategies of bribery and blackmail.20 Many scholars believe 
that reducing such corruption could greatly improve the situation of those trafficked, 
since the expense of bribes is usually passed onto victims in the form of debt bondage. 
Likewise, the corrupt nature of these border states has now transformed them not only 
into origin countries, but also transit and destination states, thus further expanding the 
range of the crime. 
                                                
18 Scarpa, 14.  
19 Tara McKelvey, “Efforts Against Human Trafficking in the United States Extend Worldwide,” Human 
Trafficking, Christina Fisanick, ed., (Detroit : Greenhaven Press), 2010 p. 110. 
20 Holmes, 102. 
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2. The Protection of Victims 
 The UN Protocol on Trafficking requires its signatories to protect the privacy and 
ensure the physical safety of trafficking victims; to assist and inform victims in relevant 
court proceedings; and to ensure the ability for victims to obtain compensation for 
damage, among a variety of other things. Yet it fails to require states (1) to aid victims in 
physical, mental, and social recovery; (2) to allow for permanent or temporary stay in a 
destination country when appropriate; or (3) to be compassionate and humanitarian with 
victims. It is clearly evident that the text does not include any binding obligations for the 
protection of victims. Instead, these latter three portions of the Protocol are merely 
suggestions to be considered by signatories. However, these very suggestions are 
necessary for the well-being and empowerment of victims. Without their universal 
acceptance and implementation, the problem of human trafficking will not be alleviated. 
 
2.1 Aiding Victims in Recovery 
 Discussions on victim recovery are closely related to that of countries’ 
immigration obsessions and the latter’s role as an impediment to the effective 
criminalization of trafficking. This is because “most trafficked persons continue to be 
treated as ‘illegal aliens’ when they come into contact with law enforcement officials, 
[and are] summarily deported without any investigation of the conditions of their 
migration or employment in the destination country.”21 Such methods, however, only hurt 
state security by undermining criminal investigations of traffickers. As long as states 
view trafficking victims as illegal immigrants, they will not be able to gain their trust or 
cooperation as informants and witnesses. Such treatment also encourages traffickers to 
                                                
21 Cameron, 7. 
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capitalize on victims’ fears of both the police and immigration officials, deterring these 
victims from running away to safety. Again, research shows that such fears are not 
unfounded, since victims are often “detained and deported with little concern for the 
abuses they endured (or for the trafficking agents they may have to face at home).”22 In 
fact, studies show that nearly fifty percent of those victims immediately deported are 
reintroduced into the criminal cycle. Also, when women are not deported, many still fear 
testifying against tormentors, as few countries have effective witness protection programs 
and those that do usually fail to extend privileges to trafficking victims.23 This puts 
victims in a very vulnerable and high-risk position, as traffickers can exploit their total 
lack of social and legal protection in order to exact revenge. Thus, many scholars argue 
that victims should be given access to witness protection, physical and mental therapy, as 
well as housing immediately after their rescue. Such treatment would hopefully 
encourage a growth of trust and an increase in testimonial evidence from victim-
witnesses in prosecution cases. 
 
2.2 Staying in a Destination Country 
 Many authors of human trafficking research and writing believe that victims 
should be given a right of temporary or permanent residence in the transit or destination 
countries where they are found.  They write: “the legalization of the status of a trafficked 
person is a crucial element in any effective victim and witness protection strategy, and 
may help to assist a much greater number of trafficked persons who would normally not 
                                                
22 Cameron, 72-3. 
23 Cameron, 149. 
 14 
dare to seek refuge for fear of deportation.”24 Such an approach would be part of a human 
security, rather than a state security approach. However, there are those who argue 
against such methods, saying that offering residence would only encourage migrants 
around the world to take the risk of being trafficked.  Either way, it is agreed that the 
Protocol is a criminal law instrument whose provisions dedicated to victim protection are 
too vague and do not create strong obligations on signatories.25  Thus, states must take 
their own initiative and cooperate with each other and NGOs in order to grant victims – 
regardless of their cooperation with authorities – the basic human protection they 
deserve. 
 
3. Cooperation Among States 
 
 The Palermo Protocol requires states to cooperate with each other and with 
relevant international organizations in the fight against human trafficking. However, as 
mentioned in the discussion of trafficking as a criminal offence, such cooperation has 
been made difficult through the existence of disparate domestic laws, enforcement 
organizations, and information databases. For example, four bodies currently have 
databases on global trafficking patterns: “the International Labour Organization (ILO), 
the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), the International Organization 
for Migration (IOM) and the US Government.”26 The ILO and US government both 
monitor and estimate the number of victims worldwide, while the UNODC observes 
trafficking routes, and the IOM collects data on victims. Yet all of these tasks remain 
difficult to perform; many European countries keep their information highly confidential 
                                                
24 Cameron, 174. 
25 Scarpa, 62. 
26 Bosco, 40. 
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or simply cannot keep track of the records accumulated by various domestic agencies. 
Recently, a good model was created in the Netherlands where the position of a Dutch 
National Rapporteur on Trafficking in Human Beings was designed so as to collect data 
from a variety of agencies and create a map of trafficking trends within the country. If 
each nation-state implemented such a government position, international organizations 
would have a much easier time assessing human trafficking movements and patterns. 
 Also important to consider is the fact that groups operating in human trafficking 
are usually loose networks: horizontally linked, flexible, and highly specialized.27 They 
can span great geographical regions and a range of criminal activities. Thus, multilateral 
action is necessary: states must each establish clear criminal definitions of trafficking, as 
well as grave criminal sanctions, criminal liability of people used as fronts for illicit 
activities, and extradition agreements and proceedings. Unfortunately, few of these legal 
tools currently exist. Likewise, states remain reluctant to use facilitating institutions that 
are already in place. For example, some EU officials are concerned about sending 
information to INTERPOL, since some of the organization’s 187 member countries 
include “high-risk” nations with regard to corruption and organized crime. The EU 
officials fear that information sent to INTERPOL may be seen by corrupt agents who will 
use it to their advantage.28 Thus, although it is clear that cooperation is necessary in order 
to engage in proactive investigations of human trafficking, scholars recognize that the 
UN Protocol did little to encourage such multilateral action. 
 
                                                
27 Bosco, 45. 
28 Jana Arsovska and Stef Janssens, “Human Trafficking & Policing: Good & Bad Practices,” Strategies 
Against Human Trafficking: The Role of the Security Sector, Cornelius Friesendorf, ed., United Nations 
Office on Drugs and Crime and the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, 
September 2009, p. 207. 
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4. Stronger Border Controls – A Conclusion 
All of the scholarly advice discussed in this introduction – criminalizing all forms of 
trafficking, protecting victims regardless of cooperation, and increasing international 
teamwork – provides evidence that deterrence at borders alone is not enough. Trained and 
vigilant border officials are certainly important, but they cannot be the sole element of 
modern anti-trafficking strategies.  For example, victims are often unaware that they are 
being trafficked until after they cross the border and their legal documents are confiscated 
or their visas are forcefully overstayed. Likewise, factors such as the corruption of 
government officials also create problems with border-focused, national security 
approaches. Instead, states must keep in mind the migratory pressures caused by 
globalization and growing economic disparities. Due to these forces, the movement of 
workers from poor to wealthy nations during the twenty-first century will be impossible 
to prevent. Thus, the developed countries of the EU should stop focusing on state security 
and start emphasizing the legal, educational, and other human security means with which 





Border Controls and State Security 
The European and Polish Approaches to Human Trafficking 
 
 In the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the idea of the nation-state 
cemented itself into the vocabulary of political and social dialogue. Territories melded 
with the concept of nationalism and as such, country borders began to delineate not only 
the physical land of the state, but also the reach of a particular ideological identity. These 
political membranes that differentiated the acceptable from the unacceptable protected 
both physical land and abstract values from intrusion. But the aggressive globalization of 
the latter half of the twentieth century onward eventually challenged such a notion of 
nation-state borders. New economic interests calling for the liberalization of trade and 
subsequent “deterritorialization” of states clashed with an enduring need for stable 
national identity. The Schengen Agreement of 1985, which was eventually incorporated 
into the European Union (EU) framework in 1999, attempted to deal with this difficulty 
by abolishing internal borders while maintaining national distinctiveness. Yet after the 
terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 the idealism behind such an arrangement was 
infected with the realization that ease of international access could have negative effects 
on security. The European response – a securitization of external border policies – 
appears, however, to cope poorly both with nation versus state tensions and cross-border 
criminal pressures. 
 By abolishing internal borders, the Schengen Agreement created one continuous 
external frontier. In order for such an arrangement to function properly, common rules for 
short stay visas, asylum requests, and border controls were deemed necessary. Yet the 
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implementation of legislation recommendations had always remained a function of the 
individual nations. It was after the Amsterdam Treaty of 1997 adopted the Schengen 
Agreements into EU law that the European Commission sought to deal with this issue 
and debate measures to “streamline law enforcement and judicial cooperation among the 
member states.”29 A lack of urgency, however, prevented advances in discussion and 
decision-making. For example, proposals for a common European border service were 
circulating throughout 2001 in anticipation of the significant 2004 EU expansion. But 
such ideas were overshadowed by other conversations regarding liberalization of 
immigration policies.30 No alterations were made to the EU’s modus operandi. 
 This changed with the Extraordinary European Council Meeting of September 21, 
2001, the result of which was an emphasis on solidarity, cooperation, and coordination. 
Security-driven proposals, which had previously been labeled low-priority, were now 
given the utmost importance. It was evident that, unlike the United States response to the 
terrorist attacks, the EU plan of action would focus on boosting security measures rather 
than defense. And, in this 5attempt to guarantee freedom from danger or threats, the 
European Union turned to the antiquated idea of protection: the border. Christopher 
Rudolph, author of National Security and Immigration writes, “Wartime nationalism 
produces a ‘rally-round-the-flag’ effect that bolsters social cohesion by mitigating 
internal differences in the presence of external enemies…”31 The EU’s distinct nations 
were suddenly uniting together in the face of a looming, alien enemy and the only shield 
                                                
29 David L. Aaron et al, “The Post 9/11 Partnership: Transatlantic Cooperation against Terrorism,” Atlantic 
Council of the United States, December 2004, p. 5. 
30 Christopher Rudolph, “Security and the Political Economy of International Migration,” National Security 
and Immigration in the United States after 9/11, The Center for Comparative Immigration Studies, 
University of California, August 2007, p. 616. 
31 Rudolph, 605. 
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they could raise was that of their external border. Such was the reintroduction of Fortress 
Europe. 
  Driving this widespread, European security mindset was the idea that the global 
developments that opened the way for hyperterrorism were also responsible for other 
(possibly related) cross-border threats, such as organized crime and illegal migration.32 
The result was a securitization of border controls and immigration through conversation 
and policymaking. (Securitization, coined by Ole Wæver of the Copenhagen School, is 
the successful, discursive construction of an issue as an existential threat to a particular 
group, thus justifying actions taken by that group against the threat.) Immigration was no 
longer seen as an “economic phenomenon to be welcomed” but as a security issue to be 
feared.33 The movement of people was presumed to be a suspicious activity, and the 
crossing of borders was linked to the occurrence of criminal behavior.  As Sergio Carrera 
of the Centre for European Policy Studies explains, this habit of securitization “place[s] 
certain persons on the move, especially those labeled as ‘immigrants,’ at the heart of 
insecurity discourses and practices.”34 All discussions regarding migration liberalization 
were suspended and a grand strategy for controlling illegal immigration into the EU was 
slowly put in place. 
 Yet this fearful ideation toward outsiders was not entirely new on the European 
stage. In the late 1960s onward, Europe began to experience widespread closure directed 
at third country nationals (TCNs). In France, where the influx of laborers had once been 
                                                
32 Andrus Öövel, “The Contribution of Border Security Agencies in the War on Terror,” Combatting 
Terrorism and its Implications for the Security Sector, (Geneva: Geneva Centre for Democratic Control and 
Armed Forces, 2005), p. 186. 
33 Geoffrey Edwards, “Is There a Security Culture in the Enlarged European Union?” The International 
Spectator, March 2006, p. 22.  
34 Sergio Carrera, “Towards a Common European Border Service?” Centre for European Policy Studies, 
Working Document No. 331, June 2010, p. 10. 
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eagerly accepted, attitudes toward migration changed when a lack of adequate housing 
led to large ethnic enclaves and urban ghettos in industrial cities. Immigrants were then 
“associated with urban plight and ethnic segregation.”35 In response, the French 
government halted all recruitment of foreign workers in 1974, stating that “immigration 
posed a threat to social cohesion.”36 Germany followed a similar pattern, which shaped 
its attitude toward migration well into the 1990s. For example, the country only allowed 
Polish nationals visa-free travel through Germany after the Polish government agreed to 
reaccept “all undocumented TCNs attempting entry into Germany across the German-
Polish border.”37 In fact, Germany paid Poland a sum of $146 million between 1993 and 
1997 in order to offset the costs of such demanding border securitization. Thus, it was 
clear from the start that Polish membership in the EU depended on controlling foreign 
migrant flows. Thus, even as globalization created an ongoing demand for low-skilled 
labor throughout Europe, it was the EU’s natural response to ward off the terrorist threat 
through the tightening of border policies.  
 One of the first actions of the Extraordinary European Council Meeting was the 
approval for a common arrest warrant to replace extradition between members. Although 
state parliaments had to separately pass this piece of legislation, it was an indication that 
enhancing cooperation across state boundaries (rather than giving law enforcement and 
judicial authorities new powers) would be the EU’s chosen approach to curbing cross-
border crime and migration. This diplomatic attitude immediately after 9/11 aligned with 
Western Europe’s willingness to reduce the significance of the individual nation-state. 
                                                
35 Rudolph, 610. 
36 Rudolph, 610. 
37 Rudolph, 614. 
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However, Eastern European states preparing to join the EU in 2004 were still undergoing 
a contrasting process of strengthened national legitimacy over the decade since the Soviet 
Union’s collapse.38 To counteract potential refusals in cooperation – e.g. Poland and 
Slovenia reacted coldly to the idea of a common EU border service by referring to the 
impact it would have on their national sovereignty39 – the EU aimed to establish complex 
network models for both law enforcement and judicial authorities. These networks would 
aim to support existing national and local services rather than replace them. 
 Eurojust and Europol were the first of many efforts to implement the theoretical 
EU commitment to network cooperation and coordination. Eurojust was created in 2002 
as an organization of the top prosecutors and judges of each member state; the premise 
behind its existence was that the post-9/11 fight against terrorism and crime had to be 
coordinated in the widest international context. It was designed to harmonize judicial 
policy and practice between members and specifically, to reinforce the fight against 
cross-border organized crime.40 Thus, Eurojust helps members coordinate their 
prosecution and investigation efforts, occasionally requesting that certain states provide 
information, set up a Joint Investigation Team, or accept that another state would be 
better suited for a prosecution or investigation. Conflicts of jurisdiction in cross-border 
cases are thus frequently resolved through Eurojust. The existence of such an 
organization has proved especially useful with the introduction of the European Arrest 
Warrant (EAW). In 2009, 256 cases regarding EAW execution were brought to the 
organization, with Poland standing third both in number of times requesting and 
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requested. Also according to 2009 statistics, the majority of cases brought to Eurojust 
dealt with drug trafficking (230), fraud (214), money laundering (125), and human 
trafficking (74 cases, down from 83 in 2008; 52 cases regarded sexual exploitation).41 
Such statistics reflect two important things: first, that Poland, which once viewed 
cooperation as a threat to national sovereignty, has realized the practical nature of an 
oversight institution for judicial coordination and second, that the organization originally 
created for the purpose of fighting terrorism has now made organized crime its number 
one priority. 
 Other than coordinating cross-border efforts, Eurojust has also committed itself to 
cooperating with other EU groups such as Europol. Otherwise known as the European 
Law Enforcement Agency, Europol works with the law enforcement agencies of EU 
nations in order to coordinate operations and gather or disseminate important 
information. Since numerous agencies deal with law enforcement in the various member 
states (e.g. border guards, police, customs), Europol also assists in aiding the multi-
agency approach. After 9/11, the analysis and insight into threats and subsequent aid also 
began to stress potential terrorist acts and the activities of organized crime. To assist this 
process, information communication was streamlined through the creation of a database 
of criminal investigations. By 2009, a majority of the help provided by Europol was in 
the area of organized crime; outside of drug-related operations, efforts to catch human 
traffickers have been a main concern. In these cases, Europol is most beneficial through 
its mobile office, an equipped vehicle that provides real-time access to databases and the 
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development of tactical intelligence.42 This information reveals the importance of 
Europol on the investigative level of law enforcement cooperation. 
 According to recent statistics, Europol has identified trafficking as a growing 
crime within the EU. Although trafficking in women for the purpose of sexual 
exploitation has stabilized, trafficking for forced labor, facilitated by inconsistent laws 
across EU states, continues to increase. Such trafficking frequently occurs across EU 
borders with the aid of both legitimate and illegitimate documents, yet Europol cites that 
levels of internal trafficking are also rising. Likewise, a growing number of cases use 
children in order to hamper investigations with child suspect and witness problems. 
Details of this nature suggest that although organizations such as Eurojust and Europol 
are making a positive difference by coordinating operations between member states, the 
EU’s general focus on establishing security through migration and border control is not 
going to effectively stem the occurrence of transnational organized crimes. 
 When the EU added ten new members in 2004, an interim Schengen agreement 
maintained the pre-enlargement borders until the new eastern perimeters had been 
strengthened.43 Intensive training and technology transfer programs prepared the security 
services of these countries. For example, through an instrument called the Phare program, 
$7.2 million went into reinforcing regional police collaboration against organized crime 
in the Visegrád Group alone.44  Today, Bulgaria and Romania – EU members since 2007 
– have yet to join the Schengen Area. This is due to the border guard training and the 
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concrete border measures now required by the European Commission for all Schengen 
members. Meeting the standards of the Union no longer involves simple facilitation of 
internal migration, but also a willingness to stem migration of TCNs. This normalization 
of policing migration has involved unquestioned extensions in police activities over the 
last few years despite the EU’s early intentions.45 Members cannot simply apply their 
own rules to their own borders; instead, they have a legal obligation to put in place a long 
set of EU regulations regarding checks and surveillance. 
 Immediately after 9/11, there was no harmonized EU legal framework that would 
supply common rules and approaches for such organized border controls. However, after 
the creation and/or strengthening of the EAW, Eurojust and Europol, the European 
Council began to remedy the lack of a relevant corpus of border legislation. 
“Technology,” writes Carrera, “in particular the use of (European-wide) large-scale 
databases and biometric technology, [was] now presented as the ‘ultra-solution’ to any 
imagined threat to the EU’s internal security (most prominently the phenomenon of 
irregular migration)…”46 The job of border guards was now greater than checking for 
proper travel documents and identification and refusing entry if such papers did not exist. 
“Expected to perform tasks related to border policing, border guarding, and border 
defense,” the border guard services were now the European means of security.47 
Logically then, the EU Commission wanted to guarantee not only the accuracy, but also 
the speed of such operations. The goal was responsible governance that did not impede 
the quick movement of goods and services. 
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   In December of 2003, the European Council adopted a European security 
strategy, which it called “A Secure Europe in a Better World.” This policy pointed to five 
principle threats to the EU: terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, 
regional conflicts, state failure or regional instability, and finally, organized crime.48 
Furthermore, this strategy claimed that Europe had to think globally but act locally by 
promoting good governance outside the EU and cooperating within its borders. Part of 
this latter cooperation would be integrated border management, with common risk 
evaluation and operational burden sharing. The nature of this institutionalized security 
policy – which created a European Area of Freedom, Security, and Justice (AFSJ) – 
paved the way for future measures, including the establishment of Frontex. 
 Otherwise known as the European Agency for the Management of Operational 
Cooperation at the External Borders, Frontex is an agency that coordinates border 
security operations between members. Based in Warsaw, Poland, it ensures that member 
actions implement EU laws and recommendations. Frontex, by liaising with other 
organizations such as Europol, is predominantly intelligence driven; it aids members in 
risk analyses and joint return operations.49 The organization has also developed important 
Rapid Border Intervention Teams (RABIT) for use in exceptional and urgent border 
situations. Last but not least, Frontex is involved in the training and education of future 
border guards, an act that reinforces the EU’s desire to field highly skilled, professional 
forces into border services. Although such operations initially appeared to threaten the 
national sovereignty of certain states – e.g. many members, including Poland, depend on 
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unspecialized conscript-based armies for border patrol50 – Frontex has continued to grow 
without conflict. In fact, the Agency’s budget increased by €82 million between 2005 and 
2009.51 In the same period, the number of irregular border crossings decreased and 
refusals of entry remained fairly stable. While such data appears to be encouraging, it 
may simply mean that criminal organizations involved in cross-border trafficking are 
finding new methods of dependable moneymaking. It is quite possible that the internal 
trafficking methods observed by Europol are circumventing increasingly secure external 
borders rather than halting operations due to their existence. 
 In addition to Frontex, the European Commission continued to make efforts to 
strengthen border control cooperation by adapting the Schengen Information System 
(SIS). The SIS is “a set of linked databases containing visa and other border-entry 
information maintained by all the Schengen treaty counties.”52 In January 2007, a second 
generation of the system – an incomplete version of SIS II – became effective, integrating 
the 10 newest EU members. This large-scale information system contains alerts on 
persons and objects that have been refused entry or stay in the EU. A central data system, 
along with individual national data systems, exchange encrypted intelligence that border 
and judicial authorities may access. SIS II thus allows guards to check for matches on the 
names, fingerprints, or license plate numbers of third country nationals attempting to 
enter the Schengen Area at external borders. Additions to the database must be based on 
court and administrative authority, by which a person or object must be proven a threat to 
public policy, a danger to national or public security, or a previously expelled TCN. 
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Although the idea is reasonable, coordinating the maintenance of SIS II has been a 
complicated task since the Schengen and EU memberships are not entirely consistent. 
Currently, the Schengen Area is composed of 22 EU states and four non-EU members 
(Iceland, Norway, Switzerland, and Liechtenstein). Not only has this had implications on 
the development of SIS II, it has also had its effects on treating the EU external borders 
as a clear geographical line. Again Carrera writes: “The imagined uniform, EU external 
border is rather a patchwork across a hugely fragmented field of points of entry and 
scattered practices of control.”53  This, however, has not prevented the European 
Commission from faithfully pursuing its goal of security through border and migration 
control. 
 In 2008, an expert group – jointly chaired by Finland and Poland – published the 
EU’s Schengen Catalogue on Border Management, which identifies four tiers of border 
security. The first tier encompasses activities in and with third countries, especially in 
countries of origin and transit, where liaison officers as well those with a consular post 
abroad could collect information in the process of issuing visas. The second involves 
operational border cooperation with directly neighboring third countries. The third entails 
measures taken at external borders, usually in the form of border checks and surveillance. 
Finally, the fourth tier refers to further security-related activities inside and between the 
territories of the Schengen states.54 The Catalogue also outlines a series of best practices 
for each tier that should be read and followed (although they are not legally binding). In 
terms of the external borders, it has been recommended that EU members undergo rapid 
checks for the validity of their documents only, whereas TCNs should be subjected to 
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thorough inspections that include randomized or risk-based checks for hidden persons 
through the use of tools such as heartbeat detectors or dogs. The document also states that 
the interrogation of all detected illegal immigrants should be carried out to identify 
facilitators. 
 Several things are troubling about the contents of this 2008 Catalogue. For 
instance, the first tier should not focus solely on information gathering by consuls and 
international liaisons. Instead, particular attention should also be given to the issue of 
corruption, as large numbers of traffickers escort their victims across borders with 
authentic visas issued by bribed officials. Secondly, by treating properly documented EU 
members without any suspicion, the border guards ignore the growing trend of trafficking 
by (and of) citizens of EU states. Lastly, the subjection of illegal immigrants to 
interrogation could deter them from cooperating. Until recently border guards were not 
even trained in relevant human rights and refugee law,55 meaning that they could have 
engaged in forms of interrogation that broke these laws and trespassed on the individual 
dignities of the immigrants. Throughout all of these EU efforts to secure borders and 
limit migration, it is clear that emerging legislation and recommendations do not reflect 
the most current security situations, especially in terms of organized crime and human 
trafficking. 
 In its latest attempt at securitization of the external borders, the European Council 
endorsed the Stockholm Programme in December 2009. Concentrating on efficient and 
effective entry to Europe, a section titled “Access to Europe in a Globalized World” also 
strives to provide security for EU citizens through border management. As such, the 
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Programme reinforces the role of Frontex, maintains its devotion to strong border 
controls, and advocates a common visa policy.56 It also continues to support the 2003 
Security Strategy’s Area of Freedom, Security, and Justice (mentioned above), which 
advocates progressing to a single area of justice with effective prosecution and conviction 
methods. To achieve this, the Programme also proposes the establishment of a European 
system of border guards (ESBG) by 2014,57 a plan that had been considered since border 
security discussions began in late 2001. However, it is likely that issues of national 
sovereignty and discrepancies in Schengen versus EU membership will complicate such a 
serious undertaking. There have already been problems with the formation of normative 
behavior that would involve cooperation between judiciary, police, and other national 
security agencies within each of the EU member states.58 Thus, to develop strong 
collaboration across state lines on such a sensitive and demanding project is unlikely to 
occur easily or quickly. 
 This is not to say that the EU countries have not been making an effort to 
participate in the migration securitization approach. Poland – a country with 1,580.78 km 
of external European Union borders59 – participated fully in the implementation of border 
security measures required by the European Council’s increasing list of related laws. 
Although the nation once balked at the idea of overseeing organizations invading internal 
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arrangements, it is now home to the institution of Frontex. Yet such a seemingly positive 
turnaround may in fact be the result of a negative anti-immigrant pattern similar to those 
that exist(ed) in France and Germany. After the collapse of communism in Poland, 
factors such as poverty, disorganization, and discontent led to a rise in unemployment 
and organized crime. The availability of jobs – seen as an inherited entitlement under 
communist rule – was no longer guaranteed.60 This desire for secure employment 
opportunities was, and continues to be, a likely influence on Polish skepticism toward 
immigration and the inflow of foreign laborers. Likewise, the country’s isolation during 
communism and its generally ethnically and culturally homogenous population may serve 
as additional explanations for the lack of interest in migrants. Thus, Poland’s willingness 
to cooperate with EU border legislation and cooperation tactics may stem from an 
intrinsic impulse to protect scarce jobs in a shifting political and economic climate as 
much as it may reflect the strong importance given to integration with Europe. 
 Regardless of the motive, the Polish Border Guard (BWM) has approached the 
issue of cross-border cooperation in the securitization of migration with the utmost 
seriousness and dedication. Reading through the mission of the Podlaski Branch of the 
BWM (which patrols the border with Belarus), it is made clear on several occasions that 
the agency views itself as the protector of all Schengen citizens; it is the guarantor of and 
spokesman for the safety and interests of all the member states.61 In order to fulfill such a 
role, however, the border guards must clearly adhere to EU legislation and the member 
                                                
60 Gábor Kardos, “Human rights and foreign policy in Central Europe: Hungary, the Czech Republic, and 
Poland,” Human Rights and Comparative Foreign Policy: Foundations of Peace, David P. Forsythe, ed, 
United Nations University, 2000. 
61 Podlaski Oddzial Strazy Granicznej, “Integracja europejska,” Accessed 10 March 2011, < http://www. 
podlaski.strazgraniczna.pl/integracja.htm>. 
 31 
interests that it reflects. This has been done through an eager commitment to cooperation 
within and outside of Polish territory. 
 The internal borders of Poland were abolished 21 December 2007, with air 
borders following at the end of March 2008. At this time border patrol stations on EU 
borders were shut down and external EU borders were strengthened. Similarly, the 
number of mobile patrols circulating throughout Poland was significantly increased in 
order to supplement the fight against cross-border crime. Tasks of the BWM were 
expanded to include the following: 1) reporting falsified Polish and/or Schengen 
documents; 2) implementing actions ordered by competent international authorities 
through SIS II;62 3) preparing for possible immediate implementation of temporary 
border controls at internal EU borders; and 4) no longer refusing entry, dictating length of 
stay,63 or punishing those transporting a person without travel documents at internal 
borders.64 In order to realize these new duties, the BWM reported working more closely 
with customs officials and police officers (e.g. by using their dogs to detect hidden drugs 
or humans in vehicles)65 within Poland, as well as with border control officers in 
neighboring EU countries.66 In addition to these instances of internal cooperation, an 
Office of International Relations under the auspices of the BWM features three 
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departments, which specialize in European, international, and border cooperation. The 
responsibilities of these departments include management of bilateral cooperation 
(especially with bordering countries such as Lithuania, Ukraine, Slovakia, and the Czech 
Republic), Frontex collaboration, and cooperation with the International Organization for 
Migration and the International Centre for Migration Policy Development.67 
Additionally, by supervising the activities of BWM liaison officers working abroad and 
remaining in contact with the foreign border protection authorities stationed in Poland, 
the border guards have continued to work closely with other Schengen/EU countries in 
order to guarantee serving the best interests of all members and their citizens.68 
 Along with efforts to strengthen cooperation with neighboring states in order to 
facilitate internal movements, Poland has also implemented and strictly followed the 
rules set out by the Schengen Agreement for the purpose of controlling TCN migration. 
Although the residents of a long list of countries may cross the external EU borders 
without a visa, most still require special papers to visit and travel through Poland and into 
the rest of the EU. Generally, TCNs require a valid travel document and a visa in order 
enter the Schengen zone. Furthermore, they must meet the following requirements: 1) 
justification for the purpose of the stay; 2) presentation of sufficient means of subsistence 
during residence and later travel; and 3) assurance that they are not a threat to policy, 
security, or international relations (e.g. through SIS II checks). Once such prerequisites 
have been met, one of the following visas can be issued and accepted: airport transit visa 
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(A – only valid in an airport zone), transit visa (B – valid transit through Schengen zone 
for no more than 5 days), short-stay visa (C – valid for no more than three months during 
a six month period), or finally, the long-stay visa (D – residence permit valid only within 
the issuing state).69 For those TCNs applying for work, the visa process must be 
accompanied by another application for a work permit. Firstly, the foreigner seeking 
employment must find an employer who will request a work permit in his name and 
secondly, there must be proof that no Polish counter-candidates are seeking the same 
position. As such, it is abundantly clear that entering the Schengen zone through Poland’s 
external EU borders is an extremely complicated process, which is made even more 
difficult for poor laborers seeking work. 
 The most immediate victims of the new Schengen borders were Poland’s closest 
neighbors. Arguably, the citizens of Ukraine, Belarus, and Russia experienced the 
greatest impediment to their international mobility with the implementation of the new 
visa regime. In their eyes, Poland was always an attractive work destination, regardless of 
EU status. Not only is Poland in close proximity to these countries, but it is also the “only 
member of the [EU] that has not fallen into a recession and that has continued to grow 
economically… because of relatively high domestic demand and because foreign trade 
makes up a small share of Poland’s GDP.”70 Likewise, since the 1990s, Poland continued 
to experience fairly rapid economic growth, especially in comparison to other Central and 
Eastern European countries. For all of these reasons, workers from the East often desired 
to seek employment within Polish borders. But with the increase in border security, a 
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decrease in legal border crossings from Ukraine, Belarus, and Russia quickly took place. 
It is probable that this decline occurred due to the difficult process of gaining a work 
permit and the expense of obtaining a visa. Krystyna Iglicka and Magdalena Ziolek-
Skrzypczak write: Ukrainians, Belarusians, and Russians “need to pay 35 euros for a 
Schengen visa to enter Poland. The visa is prohibitively expensive for Ukrainians, for 
whom 35 euros can be half a month’s living expenses, according to the Ukrainian consul 
general in Warsaw.”71 Unsurprisingly, such restrictive policies had a negative impact not 
only on Poland’s neighbors, but also on the country itself. 
 In the year 2005, Poland was reported as having a zero percent growth rate. Even 
with a steady flow of immigration taking place, the net migration rate remained negative 
before and after Poland’s accession into the European Union. Polish citizens had always 
left their homeland during various turns of the twentieth century history: after the 
violence of World War II, the establishment of communism, the imposition of martial 
law by Wojciech Jaruzelski, and the economic hardships associated with a transitional 
democracy. Poland’s status as a country of emigration continued after joining the EU in 
2004 when countries such as the United Kingdom, Sweden, and Ireland immediately 
opened their labor markets to citizens of the new member states.72 As such, Poland 
experienced the phenomenon called “brain drain,” well known throughout the former 
Eastern bloc. However, low-skilled laborers also sought opportunities for higher paying 
jobs in Western Europe. In fact, about 2 million people left the country after 1 May 2004. 
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This mass exodus left Poland with a net migration rate of -0.6 migrants/1,000 people 
between the years 2005 and 2010 along with a serious labor shortage.  
 It was this lack of workers that quickly forced Poland to lift some of the EU 
restrictions on migrant movements from neighboring countries. Beginning on 31 August 
2006, Polish employers in the agricultural sector could hire Ukrainian, Belarusian, and 
Russian laborers without work permits for up to three months in a six-month period. In 
June 2007, this concession was extended to cover all sectors. Yet even these leniencies in 
the law did not prove sufficiently effective in filling the demands of the labor market 
after Schengen accession. Thus, in February 2008 “the duration of legal work [for 
citizens of neighboring countries] without a work permit was extended from three to six 
months in any given period of twelve months.”73 Also, in order to ameliorate the burden 
posed by an expensive visa application fee, Ukrainian and Belarusian residents living 
near the Polish border could pay twenty euros for a two-year permit to travel within thirty 
kilometers of the border and stay no more than three months within a six-month period 
after the summers of 2009 and 2010, respectively. 
 Passing such arbitrary and intermittent exceptions to Schengen border security 
laws, however, sends the wrong message to Poland’s eastern neighbors and creates 
conditions for corruption on both sides of the border. As employers in Poland stop 
applying for work permits, they will be able to hire migrants for jobs with horrible and 
potentially abusive conditions without any risk of undergoing checks. Unskilled workers 
– especially young women – incapable of finding an employer and ineligible for the 
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twenty-euro permit will look to other means of irregular border crossing, potentially 
falling into the hands of human traffickers. As for those who do qualify for and receive 
short-term employment or a special two-year border pass, who will guarantee that they 
return back to their homeland? By creating these small gaps in the EU trend of border 
securitization, Poland is only putting itself in greater danger of experiencing organized 
and cross-border crime. 
 The European Union’s goal of integrated border management (IBM) aspires to 
enhance trade facilitation and border security simultaneously. The Schengen’s external 
borders are to be as friendly as possible for legal migration while being as tight as 
possible for illegal migrants. But this is a difficult objective to successfully attain. 
“Between 1996 and 2006, 43,283 people were seized at the Polish border. 18,688 of these 
people were trying to enter Poland illegally and 24,595 were attempting to illegally travel 
through Poland to an adjacent country.”74 These already large numbers grew after Poland 
joined the Schengen Area. In fact, the BWM caught more illegal immigrants in the first 
month after joining Schengen than in all of 2007.75 In the year 2009, Poland had to deport 
1,514 foreigners and issue deportation orders for another 8,527 people. Clearly, these are 
large numbers to handle for a country with little over 38.1 million people and an 
extensive exterior EU border; errors will undoubtedly occur. In fact, according to the 
Migration Policy Unit at the Ministry of Interior and Administration, one in two 
Vietnamese76 living in Poland is an illegal immigrant not apprehended by the BWM.77  
To expect that the border guards of Poland, or even potentially assigned EU border 
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guards, will have the ability to stop illegal immigration is an unrealistic notion. With the 
pressure on EU’s borders constantly increasing, especially from the governments and 
citizens of neighboring countries, there is no chance that borders will remain tight enough 
to keep out the unwanted. 
 My interest in the EU’s fixation with border securitization and Poland’s own 
attempt to bring such a concept into fruition grows out of the belief that this idea 
regarding borders as the first line of defense against cross-border crime and human 
trafficking is outdated. Although traffickers and their victims often cross physical state 
borders, this should no longer have the same meaning as it did in the nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries. As discussed in the beginning of this chapter, the state 
“deterritorialization” caused by globalization and more so by the creation and expansion 
of the EU should instead pull focus away from physical borders as barriers to crime. 
Designing countless police task forces, border guard units, supervisory agencies, and 
cooperation strategies will not end a problem with deeper roots. The cliché phrase “where 
there is a will there is a way,” applies best to this twenty-first century irregular (criminal) 
migration issue. The poor and desperate around the world (and close to home) will often 
do everything in their power in order to improve their living conditions and futures. 
 Likewise, as human traffickers have become aware of the increasing focus on 
external borders, they have also changed their methods. In Poland, for example, of the 3.7 
thousand victims of human trafficking perceived, only 815 were foreigners. Today, 
trafficking victims in Poland usually come from Ukraine or Belarus and are young 
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women (16-20 years old) who are unemployed, uneducated, and poor.78 Clearly, the strict 
border checks and policies imposed by the EU and Schengen requirements are not 
effective. Visas, work permits, length-of-stay orders, and an influx of deportation papers 
will not hinder the profitable processes of traffickers and the hopeful actions of potential 
victims. Borders and the widespread European fear of migration are not the solution to 
ending crime and protecting human rights. Thus, it is my goal to use the next few 
chapters to explore human trafficking trends as well as other, more successful means of 
combating this form of modern slavery. 
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Understanding Human Trafficking Patterns in Poland and Abroad 
 
 When attempting to understand any global phenomenon, it is first necessary to 
establish a widely accepted definition that will ease conversation and investigation. In the 
context of modern slavery, the aforementioned Palermo Protocol remains the most 
universalized explanation of this terrible occurrence. This document describes trafficking 
in human beings (THB) as the “recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt 
of persons, by means of the threat or use of force or other forms of coercion…for the 
purpose of exploitation.”79 The necessary event is the existence of exploitation, as this 
event differentiates THB from smuggling, an act that involves the illegal transport of 
people across borders and nothing more. Exploitation, a term which means, “to utilize for 
one's own ends, treat selfishly as mere workable material (persons, etc.),” 80 is thus the 
defining characteristic of trafficking. Yet, it is most important to remember that the 
development of such unfair conditions is oftentimes not immediate. In fact, today many 
people enter into the world of slavery voluntarily although ignorantly. For this reason, it 
is often made clear that the initial consent of an individual is irrelevant81 once 
psychological manipulation or physical force come into play.  
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 40 
 According to Cornelius Friesendorf, there are currently five leading approaches to 
the study of THB. The first focuses on the problem of organized crime as a fuel behind 
the issue. The second method of study centers on the question of prostitution and whether 
its criminalization affects the prevalence of sex trafficking around the globe. The third 
approach believes that THB is a result of human rights violations caused by traffickers 
and states with border security obsessions. Finally, the fourth method emphasizes the 
dynamics of the contemporary labor market and the fifth approach examines the increase 
in mobility and desire to migrate at a time of increased border controls.82 Considering the 
border securitization trends of the EU as outlined in the previous chapter, and realizing 
that many people do give consent before entering situations of THB, it appears that the 
fourth and fifth approaches are the best means of understanding and tackling this terrible 
phenomenon. Instead of focusing solely on exploitation, they both consider the root 
causes behind trafficking, such as the extensive willingness of people to migrate to 
foreign countries through unknown hands. 
 Throughout the developing world, large growth rates are met with exceedingly 
high unemployment levels, wars and military conflicts, as well as poorly managed 
political and economic situations. Likewise, in a considerable number of countries, 
women and certain economic and religious sectors of society continue to suffer from 
human rights abuses and unfair treatment that often involve a lack of educational and 
occupational resources and opportunities. These so-called push factors create a supply of 
workers eager to fill the demand for labor present throughout the industrialized world, 
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especially the European Union, where population growth rates continue to decrease.83  In 
fact, various sources claim that it is the “labor intensive needs of developed nations that 
fuel the trafficking industry.”84 It is this steadily rising desire for cheap, unregulated labor 
that poses the greatest danger, for as Sally Cameron and Edward Newman write, “People 
are trafficked into certain regions because there is a demand for their services.”85 Stuck in 
countries of origin where there is no prospect of progress or improvement of life, many 
people decide to migrate, hearing and hoping that they will find employment somewhere 
far from their homes. 
 Of approximately 214 million migrants today, the vast majority obtained full 
authority to work in, or travel to, their chosen country of destination. Of these travelers, 
only about ten to fifteen percent are currently in an irregular situation, most having 
intentionally overstayed their legally obtained visas.86 However, for the remaining 
millions, administrative obstacles or a general lack of information may have led to their 
easily exploitable, irregular status. Thus, the increasing complexity of visa and border-
crossing procedures only exacerbate many migrants’ positions. As Jayati Ghosh explains, 
“Quite paradoxically then, increased control over migrants’ mobility is likely not to 
lessen but rather to heighten the involvement of organized crime.”87 The stricter 
                                                
83 According to the CIA World Factbook, the European Union’s growth rate in 2010 was 0.098 percent. 
Many of the Central European countries, including Poland, have negative growth rates. “European Union,” 
The Central Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook, 8 March 2011, <https://www.cia.gov/library/ 
publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ee.html>. 
84 Terry Coonan and Robin Thompson, “Ancient Evil, Modern Face: The Fight Against Human 
Trafficking,” Georgetown Journal of International Affairs, Volume 6, Number 1, Winter/Spring 2005. 
85 “Trafficking in Humans: Structural Factors,” Trafficking in Human$, Sally Cameron and Edward 
Newman, eds, (United Nations University Press), 2008, p. 28. 
86 “World Migration Report 2010 – The Future of Migration: Building Capacities for Change,” (Geneva: 
International Organization for Migration), August 2010, <http://publications.iom. int/bookstore/free/ 
WMR_2010_ENGLISH.pdf>, p. 29. 
87 Jayati Gosh, “Migration and Gender Empowerment: Recent Trends and Emerging Issues,” United 
Nations Development Programme, April 2009. 
 42 
immigration controls observed throughout the EU and Schengen Area in recent years thus 
constitute a grave addition to the proliferation of THB as migrants seek creative ways to 
circumvent this obstacle. In this way, state security measures become threats to human 
security. 
 Information released by the U.S. State Department claims that 12.3 million adults 
and children around the world are in situations of forced labor and prostitution.88 As 
stated by the International Labour Office, more than a third of these trafficking victims 
obtained their job offers through social connections. Yet the statistic is nearly the same in 
the case of successful migrants. On the other hand, “victims of forced labour also 
obtained job offers via intermediaries (35.1%), which more successful migrants did to a 
lesser extend (10.3%).”89 Furthermore, the successful migrants heavily relied on family 
connections that rarely exist as an option for those forced into labor. As such, it is clear 
that the migrants who fall into the category of victims are those who have few social 
resources at their disposal and must therefore rely on unknown, mysterious middlemen. It 
is at this point that migrants’ financial and informational constraints place them in a 
position of increased vulnerability. 
 Among the 12.3 million victims of forced labor, it is estimated that about seventy-
five percent of those in industrialized countries are exploited as a result of the trafficking 
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process.90 More specifically, a U.S. State Department report released in 2006 stated that 
as many as 800,000 people,91 if not more, are trafficked across international borders 
every year. “Research claims that approximately 80 percent of transnational victims are 
women and girls and that up to 50 percent are minors.”92 These groups, along with all 
victims, are usually the weakest and most desperate members of the migrant society, 
easily separated by traffickers from their homes and friends in order to be trapped in 
unfamiliar surroundings. Determined to cross borders that are under strictly controlled 
conditions, these migrants create a market for traffickers’ services. As a result, a 
migration mediation industry flourishes under the auspices of undercover organized 
crime networks, which are easily disguised and accessed through rapid twenty-first 
century communication methods. 
 Just as globalization affects responses to social inequalities and labor market 
demands, so modernization influences the frequency and success of trafficking networks. 
The wide range of travel methods, reduced costs of transportation, and availability of the 
Internet around the world are all catalysts for the spread of THB. Each of these factors 
also contributes to the relatively cheap nature of the trafficking business. Organized 
criminal networks invest little money in comparison to their eventual yields. In fact, it is 
estimated that trafficking is a $32 billion dollar industry, which spans the territory of 161 
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countries worldwide.93 Today, profits from trafficking in women for prostitution alone 
exceed the amount of money made from trafficking in firearms and drugs.94 Yet these 
moneymaking criminals are not the typical clichéd mafia men in black muscle shirts and 
reflective sunglasses. Although part of an international syndicate, many people involved 
in trafficking are independent agents simply linking their services to a long, transnational 
chain. As the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime points out: “Networks are one 
of the defining features of the twenty-first century.”95 The people who make up these 
networks include travel agents, friendly neighborhood brokers, and inconspicuous 
criminals who exude an aura of trustworthiness and care for their unsuspecting victims. 
 The entire trafficking network process begins with the recruiter, who is ordinarily 
of the same nationality as, and a supposed friend of, the potential victim. He or she 
approaches the usually unemployed prey and, in most cases, deceives the person about 
the wages, working and living conditions of a certain job abroad or at home.96 For this 
reason, many willing victims remain unaware of their fate while traveling and crossing 
borders. It is only after they reach their final destinations that their legal documents and 
visas are confiscated or forcibly overstayed and that all illusions are shattered. This is one 
of the many reasons why even trained and vigilant border guards may not serve as a 
sufficient anti-trafficking strategy.97 At the border, there may still be no signs of 
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trafficking, even when future experiences of travelers will be extremely exploitative. As 
for very young victims including children and adolescents, most are presented as 
traffickers’ children or given falsified documents obtained through corrupt officials. 
Other times, unchecked border crossings are used in order to avoid all chances of 
detection. In any case, the victim incurs the expenses of any documents purchased, and 
traveling arrangements made, on his or her behalf. 
 Since victims of THB are predominantly poor and unemployed, they frequently 
cannot pay the initially charged fee of the trafficker or they find themselves penniless 
after spending their savings on the journey. At this point that they become increasingly 
vulnerable to debt bondage, a situation in which labor is used as a form of loan 
repayment. For example, women and girls are forced to pay off debts – accumulated from 
transportation, recruitment, and sale expenses – through continued prostitution before 
they can be set free.98 Under pressure to repay their debts, all types of unsuspecting 
migrants find themselves the subjects of exploitation and extortion. “Moreover,” writes 
Beate Andrees, “employers often ‘test’ the resistance of workers before they squeeze 
them into more exploitative situations.”99 Using debt as an excuse, traffickers can learn 
more about their employees’ reactions and use the appropriate methods to make them 
submit to their wishes. Even after debts are technically repaid, the amount of money 
owed can be increased through inflated charges for food and accommodation. As a result, 
wages are withheld and threats of denunciation (regarding illegal stays) as well as actual 
violence are used against victims. In this way, traffickers make known their position of 
power and mastery. 
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 Once migrants undergo this process of victimization, they become difficult to 
detect and rescue. As the majority of trafficked human beings are, or eventually become, 
undocumented workers, they remain “outside of host countries’ legal framework and 
[are] therefore highly vulnerable to [continuous] exploitation by predatory employers.”100 
This lack of documentation also leaves trafficked migrants with no legal basis behind 
their potential claims to owed wages and poor working conditions. Employers take 
advantage of this, drawing up fraudulent, attractive contracts during the recruitment stage 
and then switching them for contracts outlining less favorable conditions in the final 
hiring stage. “Related issues include unpaid overtime, excessive working time, lack of 
breaks and/or rest days, and others.”101 Yet the victims’ lack of legal papers and their 
existence on the margins of society deter and prevent them from reporting such obviously 
abusive conditions to the police. As such, restrictive and stringent immigration policies 
exacerbate the persistent existence of this hidden population. 
 Although state acts of curbing migration do in fact drive THB further 
underground and increase the occurrence of violence and abuse, the nature of migrants’ 
employment also has a major effect on their condition. For example, victims of sexual 
exploitation are easier to detect due to the nature of their work. Since they usually depend 
on advertisements, visits from customers and their own work on street corners, their 
position is one of greater visibility. As such, most victims of human trafficking identified 
by authorities in the last decade were sex workers, a fact that has caused many to view 
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THB only in the context of sexual exploitation.102 Yet it is becoming increasingly clear 
that sex trafficking rates are stabilizing and in its stead, trafficking for forced labor is 
increasing. For example, in 2004, “Ukraine’s identified cases of trafficking for sexual 
exploitation were more than double those for labour exploitation… [but] in the first six 
months of 2008, the number of labour exploitation cases exceeded those of sexual 
exploitation.”103 Such a turnaround is troubling news for law enforcement officials, as 
most victims of forced labor are concealed in fairly hidden locations and industries. 
Construction, drug production, and begging are some of the more popular activities 
involved in trafficking; however, many victims are also employed in rural areas, mining 
camps, private homes (as domestic servants) and garment factories that are far from 
civilization and/or the eyes of the police. “As a consequence, the detection of victims of 
trafficking for forced labour is less probable than the identification of victims of 
trafficking for forced prostitution.”104 In most cases, these workers continue work under 
their state of exploitation with little hope of being discovered or assisted. 
 Similar obstacles to THB identification are found in the growing trends of 
trafficking in children and domestic trafficking. According to Europol, an increasingly 
large number of children are trafficked throughout the EU for the purpose of illegal labor, 
domestic servitude, or sexual exploitation.105 The difficulty with this is the fact that 
children often delay or trick the law enforcement response. “Where child victims have 
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been identified it has been observed that their willingness to cooperate with the 
authorities is almost nonexistent.” This non-cooperative behavior is paired with frequent 
attempts at escape from the hands of the authorities. Says Europol: this “indicates the 
level of control exercised by their traffickers.”106 As for domestic trafficking, there is a 
large likelihood that many instances of exploitative trafficking are misjudged for crimes 
such as pandering and slavery, which may ignore factors such as deceit or forcible 
transport. For all of these reasons, it is impossible to accurately estimate just how many 
people are trafficked on national, regional, and global levels. Most scholars and 
researchers agree that numbers such as 12.3 million and 800,000 do not nearly reflect the 
exact THB situation of today.107 And the hidden nature of THB makes the hope of 
gathering a statistical pool indicative of the true numbers impossible. Likewise, the 
majority of irregular migrants are not recorded and when they are, enforcement agencies 
rarely make such information available to the public. Because of this it is reasonable to 
assume that the global problem of modern slavery is even more serious than already 
presented in various publications. 
 As already implied, the problem of human trafficking is not unknown to the 
European Union. Sources suggest that about 120,000 women and children alone are 
trafficked into the EU every year, mostly from the Balkans. In order to better understand 
this statistic, it may be helpful to examine a few other characteristics of human 
trafficking. First of all, there are several primary patterns of THB: the movement of 
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victims can be transcontinental, trans-regional, intraregional, or domestic.108 Whereas 
transcontinental trafficking is rather self-explanatory, the others are in greater need of 
explanation and often forgotten. Intraregional trafficking occurs between different 
countries that are geographical neighbors frequently separated by only one or two 
borders. Trans-regional trafficking involves victims from one region being transported to 
another region, typically of the same continent. The women and children trafficked from 
Eastern Europe into Western Europe would be part of this latter category of the 
phenomenon. Finally, domestic trafficking entails the exploitation and movement of 
citizens of a certain country within the borders of their homeland. Surprisingly, the 
incidence of domestic trafficking has been detected throughout Europe, even within the 
borders of some of its wealthiest member states.109 In fact, each of these types of THB is 
rather common within the confines of the Schengen Area. 
 Secondly, in order for the business of trafficking to flourish, it typically depends 
on the solid organization of criminal networks, as mentioned above. These offenders rely 
on guaranteed victims who want to escape “unemployment, poverty, crime, 
discrimination, corruption, political conflict” and the lack of educational opportunities 
within their homelands.110 Logically, such candidates for trafficking are most easily 
found in institutional vacuums and post-conflict areas where the enforcement of justice 
and the rule of law are weak and unstable. Likewise, recruiters, traffickers and future 
employers all take advantage of gaps in national legislation (e.g. no mention of human 
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trafficking as a crime within the penal code) and the existence of corrupt government 
officials abroad and at the borders. In fact, “research indicates that corrupt government 
officials located in origin, transit, and destination countries are often part of the networks 
facilitating migrant smuggling and human trafficking.”111 The existence of such 
conditions allows criminals to profit greatly in a few regions just outside of Schengen 
borders.112 These areas include Southeast and post-Soviet European countries where high 
levels of criminal activity and violence persist years after fighting or occupation have 
come to an end. During the past periods of transition and/or revolution, many criminals 
were able to gain a secure footing in these countries; such positions were strengthened 
over time, especially as EU border securitization following the terrorist attacks of 9-11 
put their migration mediation services in greater demand.  
 Just as countries of origin feature widespread poverty and little to no economic 
development, countries of destination are characterized by high expectations of cheap 
labor and entertainment. This dichotomy is compounded when unequal countries with 
different standards of living and opportunities are neighbors, as “the more affluent and 
attractive country will act as a powerful magnet to citizens from poorer countries.”113 
This potential problem was made even worse after the 2004 and 2007 expansions of the 
EU and Schengen borders. Suddenly, migration policies restricted the free flow of people 
across nearby borders at a time when globalization trends such as cross-border trade and 
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demand for low-skilled labor required the opposite. To make matters worse, the ease of 
travel once within the EU made the desire to infiltrate its borders even greater. Thus, the 
continued tension between a high need for workers and a low availability of legal 
migration methods in Europe within the past decade inevitably led to increased flows of 
undocumented migrants – predominantly from the newly independent states and Eastern 
Europe114 – through the hands of criminal networks. 
 Last but not least, it is important to keep in mind that, although sex trafficking 
does appear to be decreasing, the migrant population bears an increasingly feminine face. 
Jayati Ghosh writes, “In general, despite adverse conditions of work and life, most female 
migration (except in very adverse and oppressive trafficking circumstances) provides 
some redeeming features for the women concerned, mainly through an increase in their 
own autonomy, agency and self-confidence.”115 This relates back to the claim that 
women are often most vulnerable to THB recruiters due to their position of subordination 
in many parts of the world. For them, migration is a means of escape from oppression and 
discrimination and a way to start life anew with a degree of independence and dignity. 
Because of this, many women may not see themselves as victims trapped in a criminal 
web until it is too late; rather they view themselves as challenging the widespread opinion 
that migration is a criminal activity that must be curbed. Willing to do anything to leave 
behind their old life, they place their trust in the hands of smugglers and traffickers who 
will “negotiate borders and locate work far from home.”116 As such, the statistic that 
120,000 women and children are yearly trafficked into the EU and are predominantly 
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from the Balkans – a nearby unstable area – perfectly reflects these dominant features of 
the modern slavery phenomenon in the EU and around the world. 
 The European expansions of the last ten years resulted in an external land border 
of 11,000 km and a sea border of approximately 74,000 km. Writes Europol: “Combine 
this with the freedom of movement across the EU offered by the Schengen Convention 
and the EU’s exposure to organised criminality has never been greater.”117 By spreading 
so far eastward, the EU prompted a situation in which the frequent incidence of 
undocumented migration promptly clashed with strict border and immigration policies. 
This resulted in the rise of trafficking networks as one of the only available means of 
obtaining forged documents, cross-border transportation, and foreign employment as part 
of informal labor migration. What did not result, however, was an end to the occurrence 
of immigration into the European Union. In fact, the ILO estimates that “in a good 
number of European countries, the foreign born proportion of the work force is ten 
percent or more.”118 According to a 2007 study done by the European Commission, this 
undeclared workforce within its bounds is chiefly male (62%) except in France, Spain, 
and Italy where percentages are either evenly split between men and women or in favor 
of women. Likewise, the majority of undeclared workers are under the age of forty, with 
the youngest (15-24 years old) tending to work in continental and Nordic countries as 
opposed to Central Europe.119 These figures can be explained by the differing patterns in 
sex versus labor trafficking in the EU. Although these criminal currents are by no means 
mutually exclusive, there is a tendency for sex trafficking to take place into Western 
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Europe and recent labor trafficking to lean toward Central Europe. After the fall of the 
Berlin Wall, women and girls from Moldova, Belarus, Ukraine, Bulgaria, Romania, and 
the Russian Federation desired to escape their homes and work abroad; many began to 
replace trafficking victims from Latin America and Asia in the highly demanded sex 
trafficking industry of Western Europe. Today, these nationalities continue to constitute 
the majority of THB victims in the EU.120 As for Central Europe, their new acceptance 
into the EU, along with their “relatively well performing economies, demographic 
stagnation, continued emigration to Western Europe of especially skilled professionals, 
and labour market mismatches” form strong pull factors for typically mature Eastern 
European men who will eagerly fill gaps in the workforce and leave behind the 
unemployment and poor pay of their countries. 
 With this information in mind, it is easier to understand the situation and role of 
Poland in the human trafficking industry. As mentioned in the previous chapter, Poland 
had always been a country of emigration from which its citizens fled to escape the 
oppressive conditions of war and communism. But Poland’s accession into the European 
Union and eventual entrance into the Schengen zone aided the country in its 
transformation from a source state into a land of transit and destination, as well. This 
conversion resulted even as high- and low-skilled laborers continued to flow out of 
Poland into Western Europe (especially the United Kingdom and Ireland) with little 
intention of quickly returning home.121 It was the resulting labor shortages of this country 
with a population of 38,500,696 (July 2008), which prompted Poland to consider and 
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implement measures that would attract foreign labor, especially from bordering countries 
such as Ukraine and Belarus. As described by Beate Andrees, “Crime depends not on 
victims, but on customers.”122 Thus, Poland became, and continues to be, a destination 
country based on its needs and demands. But unlike the case for many other countries, 
the chief demand in Poland is not for cheap goods and services, but rather for the simple 
availability of workers. 
 To show Poland’s transition more clearly, one can observe statistics provided by 
institutions such as the International Organization for Migration (IOM). According to its 
2010 World Migration Report, “over a thousand human trafficking victims from Ukraine 
and Belarus were helped by IOM, whereas less than 10 from Poland were assisted in the 
same time frame.”123 This data may suggest that first, fewer people are leaving Poland 
and second, even fewer are being trapped in situations of trafficking. Furthermore, 500 to 
1,000 victims assisted by IOM were found in Poland as their country of destination, 
indicating that an increasing number of victims are making their way into Polish territory. 
According to Polish police and border guards, endemic forms of THB in Poland, 
including labor and sex trafficking, have been growing by the day. Again, this is plainly 
demonstrated by reports made by La Strada, a non-governmental organization (NGO) 
focused on assisting victims of THB in Poland. In data collected, the following numbers 
were observed: In 2005, 224 victims were assisted (147 Polish women); in 2006, there 
were 230 victims (198 Polish women); in 2007, 276 victims (200 Polish women) and 
finally, in 2008, there were 306 victims (253 Polish women) assisted by La Strada. 
Likewise, in the same period of time, 6-10 child victims (ages 15-17) were found by the 
                                                
122 Andrees, 30. 
123 “World Migration Report 2010,” 250. 
 55 
NGO every year.124 Data from the Polish Ministry of Interior show even graver numbers: 
“in 2002-2006, sixty victims under the age of 15 and ten aged 16-17 were identified.”125 
This demonstrates that trends such as the rise in domestic and child trafficking have been 
observed in Poland as well as the rest of the EU. Even more troubling is the fact that, due 
to the hidden nature of trafficking, such numbers are probably a tiny sample of a much 
larger reality. 
 Although it is anticipated that labor trafficking is a greater problem in Poland than 
sex trafficking, this does not remove the latter as a current threat. Since 1990, brothels 
disguised as massage parlors and day spas have become a popular Polish front for 
prostitution activities controlled by organized criminal networks. Similarly, the Ministry 
of the Interior’s Unit for Trafficking in Human Beings cited a surge in roadside 
prostitutes often located near border checkpoints and in possession of Polish tourist 
visas.126 Yet, sex trafficking in Poland remains comparatively small and the country 
serves customarily as a country of transit for such activities. The more serious issue is the 
significant increase in unregulated employment of foreign nationals due to relatively easy 
access to the Polish labor market.127 In particular, employers in seasonal industries such 
as agriculture and construction (as well as criminals working in begging) frequently take 
advantage of the uncomplicated process of recruiting nearby foreign migrants on short 
notice. Recalling information from the preceding chapter, it is understood that Poland is 
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desperate to attract foreign labor, as evidenced by increasingly lenient border-crossing 
rules between the country and its eastern neighbors, Ukraine and Belarus. Such 
permissiveness at the borders creates conditions ripe for abuse. For example, 
intermediaries and employers may exploit migrants from these countries who are 
unaware of their ability to move easily between the two particular places for the purpose 
of seeking legal, temporary work.128 Furthermore, once such migrants enter Poland, they 
may remain ignorant of their ability to leave the country without punishment during a 
period of three to six months. Once again, this puts them in a position of vulnerability. 
  The U.S. Department of State claims that geographical proximity and language 
linkages play a key role in the prevalence of Eastern European victims in Poland. From 
1995-2007, the Ministry of the Interior identified 245 victims from Belarus, 198 from 
Ukraine, 28 from Bulgaria, 18 from Romania, 17 from Moldavia, and 12 from Russia. 
But the prevalence of these nationalities may have more to do with the politics of their 
home countries than the language they speak. For example, as a result of Ukraine’s 
Soviet past, infrastructure was never developed on the northern and eastern borders of the 
country, leaving these areas with lenient controls and limited enforcement capacity 
today.129 As such, many asylum seekers and trafficked victims easily flow through the 
porous land of Ukraine in the hope of entering the EU. It is quite possible that the 
pressure from this migration route also sparked and facilitated the movement of many 
Ukrainians. As for Belarus, the administration under President Alexander Lukashenka 
boasts a horrible human rights record. This record only appeared worse after the 
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administration refused to permit the United Nations special rapporteur on human rights in 
Belarus, Adrian Severin, into the country back in 2005.130 Such examples demonstrate 
why there is such a strong incentive for both Ukrainians and Belarusians to flee their 
country in favor of their stable and close neighbor, Poland. 
 It is not the case, however, that only citizens of Eastern Europe find their way into 
Poland as victims of trafficking. Information gathered by the U.S. Department of State 
also shows that men and women from Bangladesh, China, and the Philippines have been 
found in conditions of forced labor within the country. Similarly, citizens of Thailand, 
Nigeria, Iraq, Mongolia, Vietnam, Turkey, Djibouti, and Uganda have been trafficked 
into Poland to work in situations of forced begging and debt bondage. THB is a global 
phenomenon that affects nearly every country in the world; the diverse backgrounds of 
the victims found in Poland highlight this overwhelming and dreadful truth. Yet there are 
a few undeniable particulars regarding the nature of THB in Poland. The information 
discussed up till this point emphasizes that Poland is a source, transit, and destination 
country for human trafficking. It is especially linked into the chain of intra- and trans-
regional trafficking movements within Europe, particularly stemming from post-conflict 
and transitional areas in the east. Women from such unstable countries constitute a large 
portion of the victims trafficked into and around Poland and lastly, it is assumed that 
domestic, child, and labor trafficking trends pose the most serious and growing threats 
within Poland’s borders.  
  Unfortunately, when referring to these rising threats, there is no available, solid 
proof to back the theory. In terms of labor trafficking, this is the case for several reasons: 
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1) this form of trafficking is very hidden and difficult to detect; 2) until late 2010, Poland 
only had partial criminalization of THB in its penal code; 3) the increasing efforts of 
police and NGOs remain behind in recognizing the increased victimization of men and 
rising occurrence of labor trafficking. Since the first reason has already been discussed in 
detail, focus must be directed to the second and third points. For example, although 
Poland signed and ratified the UN Convention on Organized Crime and its accompanying 
Palermo Protocols, it did not immediately update its national legislation to cover the 
entire definition of human trafficking as presented in Article 3 of the UN Trafficking 
Protocol. Although several articles of the penal code prohibited sex trafficking (including 
that of minors), no provisions specifically defined and addressed trafficking for forced 
labor until 2010.131 This fact made Poland last – among countries in the EU – to put an 
accurate and universal definition of trafficking into its laws.132 It also created an extreme 
obstacle for the identification of forced laborers as exploited victims rather than illegal 
immigrants. As such, it is possible that Poland quickly deported thousands of 
undocumented migrants without ever considering their possible need of protection or 
help.133 In this way, the lack of proper criminalization of THB certainly affected the 
possibility of assessing Poland’s trafficking situation. 
 The third reason behind the lack of solid evidence in the rise of labor trafficking 
correlates strongly with the second. After joining the European Union, Poland visibly put 
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in large amounts of time and energy into combating human trafficking. For example, in 
2008, about 500 officers were assigned to a “Central Team for Combating Trafficking in 
Human Beings [that] was established in 2006 as a special unit in the police 
headquarters.”134 In order to improve and facilitate their work, similar small units were 
created at local levels. Likewise, the Polish labor inspectorate was given access to tax 
authority records, social insurance institution registers, and central citizen identification 
systems in order to ease the detection of undeclared work.135 In 2009, training programs 
for national police, social workers, border guards, and members of the Internal Security 
Agency were provided for the purpose of strengthening victim identification and 
trafficking awareness. Prosecutors were also given specialized training as part of this 
program. Furthermore, the Polish Border Guard was recently given the right to carry out 
independent investigations into cases of THB. Last but not least, the Programme for 
Support and Protection of Victims/Witnesses of Trafficking in Human Beings was also 
implemented in 2006 to aid foreign nationals; as part of this, La Strada began running a 
National Intervention and Consultation Centre for Victims of Trafficking, which includes 
a 24-hour hotline for victims and shelters.136 This rapid rise in new institutions, laws, and 
anti-trafficking endeavors, suggest that Poland understands the severity of the problem 
and is willing to identify victims of THB and battle their persecutors. However, a lack of 
appropriate focus prevents successful results from taking place more frequently. 
 Numerous programs and people have devoted time to the identification of victims, 
but the numbers of those found pale in comparison to the estimates of victims around the 
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world. The U.S. Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Humans states that the 
ratio of victims identified to estimated victims is about 0.4 percent worldwide. The same 
is likely true in Poland, where attention remains on sex trafficking despite all efforts to 
the contrary.137 For example the Central Police Team of 2006 is specifically devoted to 
combating trafficking in human beings, human organs, child pornography and pedophilia. 
As such, the continued emphasis on the sex industry is unmistakable. Similarly, even as 
an increasing amount of THB shelters opened throughout the country after 2004, still 
none were dedicated to men as of 2009.138 This poses a grave problem, as the majority of 
victims trafficked for the purpose of forced labor are likely to be male. Finally, this may 
aggravate the fact that a large number of men refuse to see themselves as victims of 
trafficking and therefore refuse to cooperate with police or seek assistance.139 If the 
Polish government and NGOs continue to stress sex trafficking over labor trafficking, 
this tendency will continue, preventing even more people in need of help from finding the 
assistance they require. 
 Modern slavery is a sharp thorn tearing at the skin of humanity. Yet this crime 
against man is not easy to remove or eliminate. Transcontinental sexual exploitation has 
long been considered the foremost disaster within the realm of human trafficking, with 
governments and NGOs devoting much of their time and resources into combating its 
continuation. Celebrities and the media have publicized the story, hoping to make a 
difference in people’s awareness of the problem. And although such efforts are 
commendable and necessary, they remain insufficient. As the case of Poland suggests, 
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human trafficking is a much more layered and complex issue than many realize. It does 
not need to cross the world or involve a wide range of cultures; trafficking can take place 
within one’s own country and among one’s fellow citizens. Likewise, this growing crime 
does not always result in sex work by women and children. Men constitute a large portion 
of the victim population; looking for work at a time of decreased mobility, they can be 
caught in situations of forced labor and debt bondage. As demonstrated, human 
trafficking is a horrible offense fueled by the unstoppable forces of globalization. It is 
only with true knowledge and understanding of the many facets of this crime that 





Challenges to Criminalization 
Obstacles to the Successful Prosecution of Traffickers in Poland 
 
 While border securitization transformed into an idée fixe of the twenty-first 
century European Union, a sweeping misunderstanding of the true nature and extent of 
human trafficking plagued its member states, including Poland.  This combination proved 
inimical to human security; as border patrols and police focused on illegal immigrants 
crossing Schengen borders, criminals turned to ever more discreet methods of human 
trafficking. As a result, cases that once constituted the exception within the EU – labor, 
domestic, and child trafficking – have slowly evolved into an expected norm. This 
vicious cycle, a direct result of increased state security after the terrorist attacks of 2001, 
was born of the misconceived practices propagated by international human trafficking 
legislation of an earlier year. In fact, the Palermo Protocols of 2000 – supplements to the 
United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime – are the source of 
many of the errors present in today’s modus operandi to this widespread atrocity. 
 Within these protocols, attention centers on the three Ps of trafficking: 
prosecution of traffickers, protection of victims, and prevention of the crime. Although 
such goals are noble and indisputably important, the documents’ recommended strategies 
for their implementation are generally unsound and nominally concerned with human 
rights. As such, prevention through migration suppression as well as prosecution of 
transnational traffickers gain the greatest amount of attention; however, no clear 
guidelines are given for the accomplishment of either. Thus by signing the Convention, 
117 countries agreed to a vague yet clearly biased state security approach in the battle 
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against THB; by analyzing the contents of this legislation, this chapter shall strive to 
understand the effects of such bias on anti-trafficking operations of Poland. 
 
Protocol Against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air 
 Smuggling of migrants, although not the focus of this thesis, is undeniably 
correlated to the crime of trafficking, as many initially willing migrants have been found 
in positions of exploitation and human trafficking. Relying on the assumption that 
smuggling is voluntary, this protocol unfortunately ignores such a relationship. Thus, the 
document ignores all human rights issues and promotes the view that improved border 
management is a panacea for all occurrences of smuggling. It is this latter conviction that 
may elucidate opinions expressed within the protocol on trafficking and explain many of 
the problems faced in the modern fight against THB. 
 In the very beginning of the Protocol Against Smuggling, attention is quickly 
turned to migration control. Article 3 begins this trend by defining forged travel 
documentation: “For the purposes of this Protocol: …(c) ‘Fraudulent travel or identity 
document’ shall mean any travel or identity document…(ii) That has been improperly 
issued or obtained through misinterpretation, corruption or duress or in any other 
unlawful manner…”140 Shortly after, Article 6 explains the reason for this detailed 
clarification: “Each State Party shall adopt such legislative and other measures as may be 
necessary to establish as criminal offences…(i) Producing a fraudulent travel or identity 
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document; (ii) Procuring, providing or possessing such a document…”141 Finally, in 
addition to criminalizing the production and procurement of fraudulent travel documents, 
the Protocol also states that “each State Party shall take such measures as may be 
necessary, within available means: …(b) To ensure the integrity and security of travel or 
identity documents issued by or on behalf of the State Party and to prevent their unlawful 
creation, issuance and use.”142 Thus, signatories are obligated to design visas, work 
permits, and other related papers in a manner that will be difficult to reproduce. Overall, 
the purpose of these articles is to stem corruption and unapproved cross-border travel at 
the first stop of migration preparation: consular offices at home and abroad. However, 
there are a few blatant problems with such directives. 
 Tackling the issues of fraudulent travel papers and corruption is by no means a 
laughable pursuit. Indeed, a fair amount of human trafficking literature expounds on the 
existence of corrupt officials as an underlying fuel for the modern slave trade.143 There 
have been many incidents of border guards, police, and consular officials issuing 
unauthorized documents or tipping off traffickers before raids. Such episodes are 
especially prevalent in the post-communist states of Europe – in particular, ones that 
serve as source countries – where fiscal problems associated with political transitions 
often meant that officials were paid late, not in full, or not at all.144 Presented with 
increasingly closed borders, desperate customs officials and border guards gained 
additional income by accepting bribes from organized criminal networks in exchange for 
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their help and cooperation. Professor emeritus Ray Godson of Georgetown University 
terms this resulting relationship the political-criminal nexus, in which state officials 
become facilitators rather than inhibitors of crime, blurring the lines between justice and 
criminality.145 Similarly, corruption also worsens the nature of human trafficking. For 
example, bribes are a major expense for criminal networks and the cost is frequently 
passed down to victims in the form of debt bondage. Likewise, corruption may be a 
significant reason explaining victims’ unwillingness to turn to, or cooperate with, the 
police: they presume many officials will simply ignore conspicuous wrongdoing for 
profit. Logically then, countries must strive to end all corruption. 
 Chapters 2 and 3 of this thesis attempted to demonstrate that increased border 
security measures primarily result in the aggravation of an already horrible crime. The 
same is likely to take place under the anti-corruption legislation of the Protocol Against 
the Smuggling of Migrants. As governments begin to closely observe those officials most 
susceptible to bribes, smuggling activity will necessarily become ever more hidden and 
unobtrusive. As a result, administrators deciding to continue collaboration with criminal 
networks will run greater risks and naturally charge larger fees for their services. As 
explained, these burdensome prices will eventually transfer over to the consenting 
migrants who will become less likely to afford high prices. With no other options, these 
vulnerable migrants may be forced into debt bondage and consequently, exploitation and 
trafficking. 
 Careful supervision and well-researched laws should exist for the purpose of 
curbing corruption and fraudulent documentation. However, it should be incontrovertibly 
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clear that focusing on the creation and distribution of travel documents is insufficient in 
the face of such a large problem. But the writers of this Protocol cannot escape the 
border-centric ideology. Later in the document, Article 11 says: “States Parties shall 
strengthen, to the extent possible, such border controls as may be necessary to prevent 
and detect the smuggling of migrants,” as well as, “States Parties shall consider 
strengthening cooperation among border control agencies…”146 Consideration of 
methods to combat migrant smuggling outside of the state security context is barely 
visible. States are encouraged to implement preventative measures that target root socio-
economic causes of such activity (poverty, underdevelopment); however, no actual 
examples or specific guidelines are given in these few lines. The suppression of the 
movement of people is thus the dominant concept throughout this Protocol. 
 
Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women 
and Children 
 
 Written from the same viewpoint as the Protocol on Smuggling, this document 
focuses on the criminalization of an action with little regard for concomitant outcomes. In 
the words of Article 4: “This Protocol shall apply, except as otherwise stated herein, to 
the prevention, investigation and prosecution of the offences established…where those 
offences are transnational in nature and involve an organized criminal group, as well as to 
the protection of victims of such offences.”147 A couple points should immediately attract 
the reader’s attention: firstly, the contents of the Protocol apply only to traffickers and 
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victims who cross national borders and function under the umbrella of a criminal 
network; secondly, victim protection appears to be treated as a mere digression or 
awkwardly attached afterthought. As such, occurrences of domestic or small ‘family-run’ 
trafficking operations are not recognized as criminal offences within this text.148 
Furthermore, by focusing on criminalization and prosecution, this document encourages 
traffickers to explore these latter forms of trafficking, thus creating yet another catch-22. 
These conflicting contents may explain the EU and Poland’s widespread ignorance 
regarding new trafficking phenomena as well as the occasionally injudicious actions 
taken against THB. 
 As mentioned, the attention to border controls which plagues the Protocol Against 
the Smuggling of Migrants is greatly present within the Protocol on THB. In fact, the 
most important articles on the subject are nearly written verbatim from the previous 
document. For example, Article 11 specifies: “Without prejudice to international 
commitments in relation to the free movement of people, States Parties shall strengthen, 
to the extent possible, such border controls as may be necessary to prevent and detect 
trafficking in persons.”149  Similarly, the preceding article states that signatories “shall 
provide or strengthen training for law enforcement, immigration and other relevant 
officials in the prevention of trafficking in persons.”150 Once again, officials who are seen 
as relevant to the prevention of this crime are all involved with the policing and 
monitoring of borders and documents. Yet as core security sector forces are isolated as 
the prominent entity in the fight against THB, both the role of judicial personnel (judges, 
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prosecutors) and civil organizations (IOs, NGOs) in crime prevention is completely 
dismissed. 
 The prevalence of such clauses in both protocols undoubtedly contributed to the 
European propensity for border securitization and the tendency to view trafficking as just 
another form of illegal immigration. Sadly, this bad habit has led many trafficked victims 
to be treated as prostitutes or illegal aliens who are quickly deported to countries of origin 
rather than assisted as casualties of terrible crime. Similarly, traffickers are often 
prosecuted for crimes relating to immigration violations rather than human rights abuses, 
resulting in disproportionately mild punishments that do little to dissuade future 
criminals.151 Because of these misguided methods of dealing with THB, many traffickers 
have been reported to capitalize on their victims’ fears of law enforcement, reminding 
them of the dangers associated with falling to the hands of police or immigration 
officers.152 Clearly, the emphasis on trafficking prevention through migration control is 
an inappropriate priority for such a Protocol. 
 The Trafficking Protocol does not, however, completely disregard the need for 
victim protection; relevant information is contained within three short provisions. The 
first, Article 6, says the following: “Each State Party shall consider implementing 
measures to provide for the physical, psychological and social recovery of victims of 
trafficking in persons…”153 The use of the word ‘consider’ should be carefully noted, as 
it places no obligation on signatories. States ‘shall’ criminalize trafficking and strengthen 
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borders, but providing assistance to victims remains a simple suggestion throughout the 
protocol. In the second instance, Article 7 states that “in addition to taking measures 
pursuant to Article 6…each State Party shall consider adopting legislative or other 
appropriate measures that permit victims of trafficking in persons to remain in its 
territory, temporarily or permanently, in appropriate cases.”154 Finally, Article 8 contains 
these written instructions: “When a State Party returns a victim of trafficking in persons 
to a State Party of which that person is a national [or permanent resident]…such return 
shall be with due regard for the safety of that person…and shall preferably be 
voluntary.”155 These two stipulations are central aspects of victim protection, as studies 
confirm that up to fifty percent of victims immediately deported are reintroduced into the 
criminal cycle.156 Likewise, the families and communities of the sexually exploited often 
reject the returning victim; sending victims home may simply put them in a position of 
further punishment and societal isolation. But these important articles are simply 
recommendations, containing words such as ‘preferably’ and ‘consider’. Furthermore, the 
Protocol does not protect victims of trafficking from prosecution for illegal border 
crossing. The lack of such a provision constitutes a major oversight on the part of the 
Protocol’s writers, while the tenuous quality of the victim protection articles may explain 
why many European countries have developed minimal victim assistance programs. 
 Regardless, there are a few valuable provisions within the Trafficking Protocol 
that cannot be disregarded. For example, Article 9 states that signatories should 
“endeavor to undertake measures such as research, information and mass media 
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campaigns and social and economic initiatives to prevent and combat trafficking in 
persons.”157 This is closely related to another significant directive within the same article: 
“States Parties shall adopt or strengthen legislative or other measures, such as 
educational, social or cultural measures…to discourage the demand that fosters all forms 
of exploitation of persons, especially women and children, that leads to trafficking.”158 
Unlike the Protocol Against the Smuggling of Migrants, this document moves beyond 
push factors in the country of origin in order to emphasize the pull factors which exist 
within the territories of destination states. In fact, this attention to demand positively 
influenced future legislation of certain EU states such as Sweden, which passed 
legislation prosecuting customers and decriminalizing the activities of prostitutes.159 As a 
result, Sweden is now the only Western European country not flooded by girls from 
Eastern Europe escaping their homes after the fall of the Berlin Wall.160 Since the 
introduction of the Sex Purchase Act, “it has been estimated that there are only about 100 
prostituted people in the country for around 9 million inhabitants.”161 Just as fighting 
demand alleviates trafficking problems, it is likely that a lack of laws dealing with 
demand may aggravate THB trends. By highlighting this, the Protocol encourages 
countries to follow in the steps of Sweden and battle trafficking by means other than 
border controls. However, the document as a whole under-appreciates the value of this 
method. 
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 Overall, the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking forms a shaky 
foundation for THB legislation and governmental action in Poland, Europe, and around 
the world. Priority is given to immigration and border controls at the expense of human 
security and victim protection. Likewise, the convoluted structure of the trafficking 
definition162 within the Protocol – although necessary – makes real-life translation and 
application difficult. For this reason, countries lacking their own definition of trafficking 
find the Palermo Protocol an unwieldy substitute; as a result, prosecutors and judges 
rarely use it in relevant cases. Furthermore, the vague nature of the definition has led to 
discrepancies in the legal frameworks of states, creating a fundamental impediment to an 
effective response to trafficking.163 This, when combined with provisions dedicated to 
victims’ rights that are few and uncommitted, provides signatories with biased demands 
and little solid direction. Based on these grounds, it is evident that the nature of the 
Trafficking Protocol was a source of inspiration for the renewed construction of Fortress 
Europe; member states were advised to secure their own borders and keep out the 
unwanted as a means of stemming terrorism and transnational crime. 
 
European Convention on Action against Trafficking In Human Beings 
 It was not until 16 May 2005 that the European Council released this document 
for accession in Warsaw, Poland as a means of directing both European and outside 
signatories toward a human rights mindset on the subject of human trafficking. Unlike the 
preceding protocols, the text of this Convention gives the greatest priority to the rights of 
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victims and the need to discourage demand for their services.  However, some elements 
of the Palermo Protocols’ mentality remain: Articles 7 and 8 reiterate the Trafficking 
Protocol’s dedication to strengthening border controls and cooperation between security 
agencies, Article 18 criminalizes all activity as defined in the Protocol’s definition of 
trafficking, and Article 20 establishes the forging and procurement of fraudulent travel 
documents as criminal offences. Yet the change in focus is also quickly apparent; added 
to the Protocol’s definition of trafficking is item (e), which clarifies that “‘Victim’ shall 
mean any natural person who is subject to trafficking in human beings as defined by this 
article.”164 Although rather ordinary phrasing, the inclusion of this meaning automatically 
differentiates the European Convention from its precedent, the Palermo Protocol, by 
treating victims as more than an afterthought. 
 The new humanitarian attitude of the Convention is reinforced several times 
within the preamble. First, it is written that “respect for victims’ rights, protection of 
victims and action to combat trafficking in human beings must be the paramount 
objectives…” of those tackling the crime.165 Unlike the Protocol, the protection of 
victims is thus given greater consideration than criminal prosecution and crime 
prevention. In fact, the preamble acknowledges this need for change in the following line: 
“Taking due account of the United Nations…Protocol thereto to Prevent, Suppress and 
Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children with a view to improving 
the protection which they afford and developing the standards established by them…” As 
such, the European Convention realizes the faults that were present within the Protocol 
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and aims to correct them, beginning with the expansion of the terms of the Convention to 
all forms of trafficking, whether domestic or transnational, whether connected to 
organized crime or not.166 
 Another manner in which the Convention demonstrates its serious dedication to a 
human rights approach to trafficking as well as demand reduction is through Articles 5 
and 6, whose contents say that Parties: 1) shall strengthen effective policies and programs 
for persons vulnerable to trafficking and for professionals concerned with trafficking in 
human beings; 2) shall promote a human rights-based approach; 3) shall disseminate 
accurate information to all seeking legal entry into their territory, and 4) shall discourage 
demand through target information campaigns and education programs. Although 
attention is still paid to prevention of unsafe or unnecessary border crossing, the 
dominant focus is given to prevention of victim exploitation. Likewise, the words 
‘consider’ and ‘preferably’ that were so characteristic of the Palermo Protocol on 
Trafficking are nowhere to be found. As a result, these directives are neither vague nor 
optional; signatories are expected to follow every instruction. And in terms of victim 
protection, these instructions are many. 
 Of the sections dealing exclusively with victims’ rights, Article 10 is one of the 
first, claiming that a victim of trafficking shall not be removed from a Party’s territory 
until the identification process is completed and that person has received assistance.167 
Even after the creation of the Palermo Protocol, many signatory states only provided 
support programs and assistance to those victims willing to cooperate with authorities; all 
others were summarily deported. This new convention, however, included provisions 
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ensuring that such activity could not take place. Article 12 states: “Each Party shall adopt 
legislative or other measures as may be necessary to assist victims in their physical, 
psychological and social recovery…[as well as] to ensure that assistance to a victim is not 
made conditional on his or her willingness to act as a witness.”168 Yet these stipulations 
were not enough, another article insisted that signatories provide a reflection period of at 
least 30 days for all presumed victims and Article 14 asked that states issue renewable 
residence permits to victims under special circumstances or requiring a prolonged stay for 
continued cooperation with police investigations or judicial proceedings. By providing 
this vast range of non-coercive options for victims, it is possible that country authorities 
could foster trust as well as a proclivity for cooperation among future victims. In this 
way, the Convention’s human security focus may actually promote national security 
better than any border controls currently in place. 
 In terms of legal action taken against perpetrators, the Convention guarantees that 
the nature of proceedings effectively punish traffickers and support victims. Article 15 
demands that states offer free legal aid to victims and “provide, in [their] internal law, for 
the right of victims to compensation from the perpetrators.”169 Later, Article 23 asks 
Parties to adopt effective, proportionate, and dissuasive sanctions that are commensurate 
with the punishments for similar crimes. While punishing traffickers, the Convention also 
ensures that victims do not receive similar treatment. Article 26 instructs that, “Each 
Party shall, in accordance with the basic principles of its legal system, provide for the 
possibility of not imposing penalties on victims for their involvement in unlawful 
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activities, to the extent that they have been compelled to do so.”170 As previously 
discussed in this chapter, many countries continue to treat victims as illegal immigrants 
who qualify for quick deportation. But as Helga Konrad writes, “Though the struggle 
against human trafficking is connected with the struggle against illegal migration, it 
should be clearly understood…that only the traffickers should be prosecuted for illegal 
border crossing, and not the victims of trafficking.”171 After five years, the European 
Council finally recognized the value in this view; as a result, the words of the European 
Convention impose it on all signatories. 
 Furthermore, acknowledging the importance of legislative and judicial branches 
in the fight against trafficking, the Convention outlines certain aggravating circumstances 
that should prompt increased penalties for traffickers. According to Article 24, such 
situations include: “(a) the offence deliberately or by gross negligence endangered the life 
of the victims; (b) the offence was committed against a child; (c) the offence was 
committed by a public official in the performance of her/his duties; (d) the offence was 
committed within the framework of a criminal organization.”172 These conditions cover 
many of the stipulations within the Palermo Protocols, including trafficking through 
organized criminal networks and corruption. However, among these, the mention of child 
trafficking is most important; convictions against child traffickers are very rare within the 
European Union and child victims are rarely identified. In fact, between the years 2000-
2007, final convictions for this crime were only reported in four EU member states.173 Of 
course, the Convention’s content on child and other rare forms of trafficking could be 
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more specific and severe, but its acknowledgement is still a significant step in the right 
direction. It is evident that the European Council understands some of the gravest 
trafficking problems faced within the EU and has undertaken steps to address them. 
 Yet despite the prevailing concern with human security, the European Convention 
still has its flaws. For example, Article 12 stipulates that victims lawfully resident within 
a Party’s territory shall be given access to the labor market as well as vocational training 
or education.174 Although such a provision is good and necessary, victims that entered 
without a valid work visa are still not granted the one benefit they want most: the right to 
work. Yet in the end, such misguided directives are a very small part of this assertive 
document, which has already been ratified by 34 countries and signed by nine others. 
Poland signed the document on its release date of 16 May 2005, ratified on 17 November 
2008, and finally implemented it on 1 May 2009 as a supplement to the already applied 
Palermo Protocols.175 Unfortunately, GRETA (the Group of Experts on Action against 
Trafficking in Human Beings), a monitoring committee established in Article 36 of the 
Convention, just began its first evaluation of Poland’s progress on February 2011. 
Although the results of this investigation are currently unavailable, further analysis of 
Poland’s recent changes to its legislation and victim protection programs should reveal an 
the impact these documents have made on the country’s fight against human trafficking. 
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Poland’s Implementation of International Trafficking Law 
 As examined in Chapter 2, Poland’s border-crossing and visa policies generally 
follow the European Union’s stringent attitudes and requirements, which likely stem from 
state security directives within the Protocols on both Smuggling and Trafficking.176 
However, as a member of the EU, the country has also made recent strides in conforming 
to the European Convention’s instructions in areas such as victim assistance, trafficking 
prevention, and transnational cooperation. Surprisingly, it is in the area of criminalization 
that Poland has encountered the most difficulty implementing international law 
expectations. Yet, as will be demonstrated in the remainder of this chapter, this one factor 
may explain the rather slow progress Poland has made in developing a long-term, 
successful anti-trafficking strategy for the country. 
 Recalling the information provided within the chapter on trafficking trends in 
Poland and the European Union, it is logical to suppose that Poland is home to a much 
larger number of trafficking victims than officially reported or found. For instance, it is 
estimated that anywhere between 300,000 and 500,000 Ukrainians currently work 
illegally on Polish territory, while only about 3,000 are in the country with valid work 
permits. Likewise, “while Polish consulates in Vietnam issue from 500 to 700 visas 
annually, the number of Vietnamese people in Poland is estimated at 50,000 to 
60,000.”177 The disproportionate amount of undocumented workers and residents within 
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the country leaves plenty of room for trafficking activity, especially in less visible 
employment sectors. Not long ago, Poland attempted to handle this problem; for 
example, the National Labour Inspectorate was vested with the obligation to oversee the 
legality of the employment of foreigners in 2007. Nonetheless, this power excluded 
supervision over farms and households, two hidden areas that frequently employ 
trafficked victims and undocumented workers. Thus, although it is noteworthy that 
Poland is tackling the issue of illegal workers as a possible pool of trafficking victims, 
there is still much room for improvement. 
 The work of the Labour Inspectorate does not, however, constitute Poland’s only 
efforts at victim identification and protection. In accordance with the European 
Convention’s mandate, the country amended both the Aliens Act and the Act on the 
Protection of Aliens on the Territory of the Republic of Poland in April of 2005. Through 
these amendments, victims considering whether to cooperate with law enforcement 
officials could be granted residence permits as suggested within the Palermo Protocol. 
Since January 2009, soon after the ratification of the European Convention on 
Trafficking, these provisions were broadened. First of all, the reflection period for all 
foreign victims was extended from two to three months. (The term ‘reflection’ is used, as 
this three month-long period gives victims time to reflect on whether their desire to 
participate in criminal proceedings.) Secondly, if a victim decides to cooperate with 
judicial actions, he/she may apply for a six-month residence permit, which may be 
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renewed if necessary.178 Thirdly, and most importantly, such victims may apply for a 
work permit from regional (Voivode) authorities.179 This latter fact demonstrates that 
Poland went a step further than the Convention required, providing work permits based, 
not on the legal status of a victim’s entry status, but rather on the readiness to cooperate 
with investigations or prosecutions. 
 After the passage of these victim-rights amendments and the signing of the 
European Convention, there was an immediate increase in the number of identified 
victims in Poland. Whereas 1,834180 victims were registered during the period of 1995-
2006 (on average, 152 victims per year), 1,021 were disclosed in 2007 alone, and 315 
were uncovered in 2008. Yet, sadly, figures suggest that this flood of discovered victims 
was not correlated with the increased availability of victim service and assistance 
programs.  For example, between 2002-2006, the police provided protection to only 16 
victims while the La Strada Foundation – an NGO – assisted 36 victims. These small 
numbers (especially when compared to 152 victims a year) imply that few victims made 
use of accessible help or had knowledge of these services. Unfortunately, the numbers 
did not change significantly following the 2007 improvements to victim assistance laws. 
To illustrate this point, not one victim took advantage of the three-month reflection 
period in 2009 and only two foreign victims were granted temporary residence. Although 
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there was an increase in cooperating victims – 21 in 2008 and 22 victims in 2009 –these 
numbers remain unexpectedly small. For this reason, it is necessary to assume that there 
is a secondary obstacle to improvement, which may in fact be Poland’s lag in the 
effective criminalization of trafficking. 
 Before examining Poland’s trafficking laws, it should be noted that the country 
has also enhanced work in trafficking prevention and transnational cooperation over the 
last few years. Since 2007, Poland has conducted an information campaign on trafficking 
for forced labor, particularly targeting Polish nationals seeking employment in other EU 
states. “The Ministry of Interior and Administration, in cooperation with the La Strada 
Foundation, published a guidebook for Poles working abroad, warning them about the 
dangers of labour exploitation.”181 Through this operation, Poland has significantly 
decreased its role as a source country for trafficking in human beings. Likewise, 
government-produced leaflets containing similar information were distributed in Polish 
consular offices located in three of the largest source countries of trafficking victims in 
Poland: Ukraine, Belarus, and the Russian Federation. Rather than focusing on legal 
border crossing, these pamphlets warn future migrants of the signs of human trafficking 
networks and list the places to get help if exploitation takes place. It is possible that this 
rise in visible information prompted the increased number of victims seeking freedom 
from their persecutors in the years of 2007 onward. 
 As for transnational cooperation, Poland’s police and prosecution offices have 
formed bilateral agreements with quite a few countries. For instance, signed pacts 
regarding operational information sharing now exist with almost every European country 
                                                
181 “Poland,” European Commission Fight against Trafficking in Human Beings. 
 81 
as well as with various third countries. Likewise, “cooperation between liaison 
officers…has been crucial, especially with countries such as Belarus, Bulgaria, France, 
Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, Ukraine and the United Kingdom.”182 
These treaties proceed from the realization that human trafficking is most often a chain of 
activities that crosses borders; as such, these transnational movements require a 
transnational response. This is especially true with regard to countries whose citizens are 
most often found within Polish borders. For example, from 2002-2006, 362 people were 
accused of trafficking; 82 were foreigners,183 most of whom were Bulgarian and 
Ukrainian citizens. Thus, it is logical for Poland to form strong ties with these countries. 
According to the National Prosecutor’s Office, bilateral agreements with Ukraine allow 
for direct contact between police officers, without the need for involvement of the 
Ministry of Justice. This allows for quick extradition of criminals from Poland to 
Ukraine: “[As of 2 June 2010, there have been] 3 cases of extradition for trafficking-
related crimes and 12 trafficking-related cases using the European arrest warrant 
procedure.”184 Clearly, it is indisputable that such transnational cooperation is both taking 
place and proving useful to the Polish fight against THB. With continued practice, such 
partnerships may even lead to necessary data collection185 and improved anti-trafficking 
methods throughout the region. 
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 Yet such human security improvements cannot make a large difference in Polish 
trafficking patterns without the presence of appropriate legislation and judicial action 
against the crime. Successful prevention of THB necessarily includes effective 
prosecutions that will deter traffickers from entering or operating in a specific country. 
Such prosecutions will not take place, however, without a clear definition of trafficking 
in a country’s legislation as well as grave criminal sanctions that, in the words of the 
European Convention on Trafficking, are effective and dissuasive. A lack of such 
measures will only continue to attract traffickers and their activities. Unfortunately, until 
May 2010, Poland lacked both the definition and criminal sanctions recommended 
throughout all international trafficking legislation. For this reason, in order to better 
understand the Polish trafficking and victim assistance patterns of the first decade of the 
twenty-first century, one must first be aware of the laws that existed prior to the 
definition’s introduction. 
 Prior to 2010, three articles in the Polish Kodeks Karny (Penal Code) were used to 
prohibit all forms of trafficking in humans: Article 203, Article 204 (sections 3 and 4), 
and Article 253. In this first article, it was provided: “If someone uses force, threats, 
deceit or abuses the dependent or vulnerable state of another person in order to get them 
to perform prostitution, he/she will be subject to 1-10 years in prison.”186 The next article 
also dealt with the issues of prostitution and sexual exploitation. Section 1 stipulated that 
if, for the purpose of material gain, someone persuades another person to perform 
prostitution, that persuader may receive up to three years in prison. Section 2 further 
elaborated this first claim, stating that whoever takes money from the person’s 
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prostitution is also eligible for a similar punishment. As for paragraphs 3 and 4 – those 
most often used in trafficking cases – they stipulate that “If the prostituted person is a 
minor, the perpetrator is subject to 1-10 years in prison” and “If a person recruits or takes 
other people with the purpose of their prostitution abroad, they are also subject to 1-10 
years in prison.”187 Although these old provisions were detailed – covering domestic, 
transnational, and child sex trafficking – they completely ignored all other forms of THB, 
including crimes such as trafficking for labor, adoption, or organ removal. 
 In order to solve this problem, the Penal Code also included the ambiguous but 
all-inclusive Article 253. Paragraph 1 of this provision stated, “Whoever traffics in 
human beings, even with their consent, is subject to at least three years in prison.”188 
Section 2 expanded upon this law, saying that whoever organizes illegal adoptions for the 
purpose of material gain is subject to a punishment of 3 months to 5 years in jail. This 
second stipulation is rather surprising as cases of trafficking for illegal adoption are 
scarce within Poland, especially in comparison to other forms of trafficking which are 
completely ignored throughout the Penal Code. So even though a comprehensive 
prohibition of trafficking existed in Polish law, the lack of a detailed definition of THB, 
paired with the earlier emphasis on sexual exploitation, created an inevitable obstacle to 
the prosecution of a variety of criminals. There was, however, one redeeming aspect to 
these laws: their recommended disciplinary sanctions were well chosen, commensurate 
with punishments for other crimes such as rape. Unfortunately, without a description of 
trafficking existing within Polish criminal legislation, such sanctions were rarely 
penalties. 
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 The lack of an appropriate definition of trafficking compelled prosecutors on 
trafficking for forced labor cases to draw upon any alternative laws they could find. As 
such, Article 253 was often combined with organized crime and/or employment statutes. 
These laws included, but were not limited to: Article 218 of the Penal Code, which 
provides penalties for the malicious or persistent violation of employees’ rights; Article 
220, which criminalizes the exposure of employees’ lives or health to danger; and Article 
221, which makes the failure to notify of an accident at work, or an occupational disease 
of a person who performs paid work, into an illegal action.189 Prosecutors also employed 
the contents of Article 27 from the Act on the Employment of Temporary Workers: “Any 
party, being a user employer or acting on behalf of a user employer, that fails to provide 
the temporary worker with safe and hygienic working conditions at the place assigned for 
the performance of temporary work…shall be subject to a fine.”190 Each of these statutes 
criminalized actions associated with, and regularly included in, actual forced labor cases. 
Even so, they did little to cover the unique, aggravated nature of trafficking. 
 In addition to the use of other Polish laws, prosecutors occasionally attempted to 
invoke international treaties and agreements in order to prove the occurrence of crime. 
For example, the International Labour Organization’s Convention No. 29 – signed and 
ratified by Poland in 1958 – requires the criminalization of forced labor, which it defines 
as “all work or service which is exacted from any person under the menace of any penalty 
and for which the said person has not offered himself voluntarily.”191 Since, under Article 
91 of Poland’s Constitution, all international treaties and agreements that are ratified by 
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Poland automatically become part of the Polish legal system,192 the above definition of 
forced labor is binding in all Polish courts, as is the UN Protocol’s definition of human 
trafficking. But according to Poland’s National Action Plan Against Trafficking in 
Human Beings for 2009-2010, years of research show that Polish court judgments were 
not always in accordance with the letter or spirit of these definitions and that such 
definitions were also applied inconsistently.193 For all of these reasons, since 2007, 
Poland’s National Programmes on Trafficking recommended the addition of an 
amendment defining THB to the Penal Code. Yet the process of drafting such an 
amendment lasted over three years, impeding any future progress in the field of punishing 
traffickers. 
 Meanwhile, Poland attempted to compensate for its insufficient laws through 
other methods, such as the training of prosecutors. For example, in June 2007, 
“prosecutors acting as consultants to trafficking in human beings issues were appointed 
throughout the appeal prosecutors’ offices.”194 In fact, these measures were met with 
some degree of success; the number of closed proceedings related to THB in 2007-2008 
increased by nearly fifty percent compared with the years 2004-2006. But this was not 
enough; a large number of cases continued to be dismissed, pointing to the need for more 
extensive educational opportunities for prosecutors and judges.195 This can be seen from 
statistics over the period of 1995-2006, when 77.88 percent of cases were discontinued 
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due to the non-existence of an offence. Even as late as 2005, 12 out of 31 cases were 
dropped for this same reason. Information indicating that such patterns were ongoing in 
2007-2008 was undoubtedly troubling and served as yet another argument for the passage 
of a definition of THB into the Penal Code. 
 For all of the above reasons, convicting criminals for their participation in THB 
activities was always a difficult task in Poland. From 1998-2003, only 64 individuals 
were validly convicted and imprisoned for this crime, while 24 were granted conditional 
suspension of the execution of their penalty.196 Although numbers significantly increased 
after 2007, problems remained. For example, from the 122 alleged trafficking violations 
investigated in 2007, only 62 individuals were actually prosecuted and furthermore, only 
43 were convicted. After post-appeal sentencing, 24 convicted traffickers received 
suspended sentencing and the remaining convicts were given prison sentences of one to 
five years.  Similar patterns were detected in 2008 and 2009. In the latter year, Polish 
police investigated 105 alleged cases of trafficking, after which authorities prosecuted 79 
individuals and convicted 52 of them under Articles 253 and 203.197 After the appeals 
process, approximately 40 cases resulted in an enforced indictment. Exacerbating this 
poor rate of final conviction and punishment was the actual length of the THB cases; 
preliminary proceedings (such as investigations) generally lasted around nine months and 
“the time between the referral of a case to court and the start of the trial [was] often long 
– between five and eight months.”198 Realizing that judicial training and victim assistance 
programs were not effective in the important process of punishing traffickers, Poland 
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finally decided to adopt an amendment that defined trafficking in human beings for the 
Penal Code in May 2010. 
 This new definition of human trafficking was added to the Penal Code’s chapter 
titled, Clarification of Important Terms. Labeled Article 115, paragraph 22 this 
clarification reads as follows: 
“Trafficking in human beings is the recruitment, transportation, transfer, 
harboring or receipt of persons with the use of:  
1) violence or threats,   
2) abduction,  
3) deceipt,  
4) misrepresentation or exploitation of others’ ignorance, 
5) misuse of an employment contract or the exploitation of a 
vulnerable situation or a state of helplessness, 
6) the award, acceptance, or promise of material or personal 
benefit to a person having custody over another person 
- in order to exploit, even with consent, especially in prostitution, 
pornography or other forms of sexual exploitation, or in forced work or 
services, in begging, in slavery or other forms of degrading exploitation, 
or in order to obtain the cells, tissues or organs in violation of the law. If 
the perpetrator’s behavior applies to a minor, it is trafficking in human 
beings even when the methods of paragraphs 1-6 are not used.”199 
 
It is immediately apparent that this definition is closely modeled on the articles and 
trafficking descriptions present within both the UN Protocol and the European 
Convention; as such, it successfully covers all trafficking acts criminalized by these two 
international documents. As for a provision that specifically criminalizes these trafficking 
acts, the new Article 189a was added, saying: 1) Whoever commits trafficking in persons 
shall be subject to the penalty of imprisonment for a minimum term of 3 years; 2) 
Whoever makes preparations to commit the offense of THB shall be subject to the 
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penalty of imprisonment for 3 months to 5 years.200 This stipulation is especially 
important as it criminalizes not only the action but also the intent, thus displaying an 
obvious commitment to the persecution of traffickers. This serious attitude toward 
trafficking is also visible by the physical relocation of the law within the Penal Code: 
whereas Article 253 (now removed201) had been located under the chapter “Crimes 
against Public Order,” Article 189a is currently placed in the chapter “Crimes against 
Freedom.” The text of the original article, numbered 189 states: “Whoever takes away 
someone’s freedom is subject to 3 months to 5 years in prison. If unlawful deprivation of 
freedom lasts for more than 7 days or is paired with harassment/torment, they are subject 
to 1 to 10 years in prison.”202 Moving anti-trafficking law into this realm consequently 
shifts the focus away from THB’s effects on the public and the role of the perpetrator and 
toward the negative influence on the victim; actions done against people are penalized 
rather than simple actions themselves. 
 The recent date of the trafficking amendments prevents the analysis of victim- and 
prosecution-related results, but it is likely that the new definition, phrasing, and 
placement of trafficking in human beings within the Polish Penal Code will make a 
significant, positive impact. Although the criminalization of trafficking for forced labor is 
still lacking, the new definition does acknowledge the existence of trafficking for work or 
service of a compulsory nature. This change, along with the removal of Article 204(4), 
may eventually cause police, prosecutors, and judges to expand their personal ideas of 
trafficking beyond the sexual exploitation of women. As a result, a greater assortment of 
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criminals may be given the punishment they deserve and likewise, a larger number of 
victims may receive the assistance they so greatly need. 
 Most importantly, however, Poland finally concluded that the border 
securitization and migration control methods propagated by the Palermo Protocols are not 
sufficient in the fight against trafficking in human beings. Strengthening the role of 
border guards, creating strict visa policies, and building transnational cooperation 
between countries’ security sectors may have led to minor improvements, but without 
effective legal action against trafficking criminals, such measures could have no lasting 
influence. As demonstrated, the number of irregular migrants and trafficking cases 
flowing into the country has only increased in spite of all state security efforts. At the 
same time, all attempts to boost human security through victim assistance have been 
unsuccessful without proper criminal legislation. Thus, it can be seen that the previously 
recommended strategies implemented to stem traffickers’ willingness to enter Poland 
were inadequate. Alternatively, after careful research, it is clear that quick investigative 
procedures, consistent legal actions and strict prison terms will be more powerful 
deterrents to crime. As such, if Poland remains committed to its current human rights-
based actions under its new legislation, it is quite possible that the fight against 






Non-Governmental Organizations and Human Security 
 
 Like the raging waters of a flood, the forces of human trafficking will not stop at 
man-made walls; instead, these fluid elements will always manage to find ways around 
them. While water seeps through cracks and turns inevitable corners, human traffickers 
adopt increasingly hidden operational methods. For this reason, Chapters 1 and 2 were 
juxtaposed to reveal the discrepancy between strengthened border controls and rising 
trafficking numbers. Although the European Union’s emphasis on state security through 
border surveillance was an understandable – even logical – response to the terrorist 
attacks of 2001, this war-like strategy remains antithetical to the protection of human 
rights. Trafficking in human beings should not be treated as an assault on states but rather 
as a crime against humanity. Yet as Chapter 3 demonstrated, such an attitude has been 
especially difficult to cultivate after the ratification and acceptance of the Palermo 
Protocols, which propagate prevention through state securitization. 
 Luckily, the European Union and its member state Poland, eventually realized 
that combating THB requires the successful prosecution of traffickers and protection of 
victims. For example, Poland finally made changes to its Penal Code in 2010, 
criminalizing human trafficking in a blatant manner and removing the subtleties of its 
previous laws. Likewise, the EU drafted a Convention compelling signatories to take 
steps in the assistance of trafficking victims, which quickly led to the expansion of 
victim-based programs throughout Poland. But even with a rise in the serious 
consideration of a human rights approach to THB, states still refuse to let go of the old 
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approach of migration control. As such, a lack of resources and time for victim assistance 
and criminal prosecution development has prohibited a notable impact on trafficking 
trends. Predictably, EU member states will continue protecting their territories from 
unwanted infiltration; other changes will be made only in response to EU demands and 
funding promises. For this reason, the Conclusion of this thesis will argue that, with some 
changes, the inherent nature of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) may make them 
the best vehicles of change to modern anti-trafficking policies. Through the continual 
research and work of NGO staff, the human security approach may finally gain enough 
momentum to compel a significant change in the current government approaches to this 
multi-layered phenomenon. 
 Today, NGOs are perceived as both agents and products of such forces as 
globalization and democracy. Acting as representatives of civil society, they stand in 
positions of power analogous to those of governments and international corporations, 
participating “in value creation and governance around the world.”203 Typically separated 
from both state and market, these NGOs are formed out of the interests, will, and 
organization of dedicated groups of people for the purpose of meaningful collective 
action. It is this very root independence from the state that makes NGOs particularly 
effective in the fight against trafficking. For example, states often ignore certain human 
rights issues, fearing that necessary responses would infringe upon their sovereignty,204 
yet NGOs have no need to consider such a possibility. Likewise, third-party status allows 
NGOs to assess the work of public- and private-sector actors within society and to 
                                                
203 Hildy Teegen, Jonathan P. Doh, and Sushil Vachani, “The Importance of Nongovernmental 
Organizations (NGOs) in Global Governance and Value,” Journal of International Business Studies, Vol. 
35, No. 6, November 2004, p. 464. 
204 Here, it could be argued that states see the movement away from border controls and toward victim 
assistance (through extended residency, etc) as a form of infringement on their sovereignty.  
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determine the quality and success of their anti-trafficking actions.  Last but not least, due 
to their highly specialized experts and resources, these organizations may contribute to 
the re- building of social capacity and the closing of governance gaps in countries of 
origin, transit, and destination.205 
 According to Dina Francesca Haynes, “When countries simply adopt legislation 
in order to secure entry into the European Union or to meet financial assistance 
requirements, there is no real ownership or commitment to eradicating trafficking. The 
legislation…will not be fully or adequately implemented at the local level without serious 
political will.”206 However, NGOs are generally immune to these impulses of ‘selling 
out’ or conforming for money. Having rallied and come into existence around a particular 
idea, they are unlikely to give up quickly or lose dedication. Thus, because of their 
commitment to social welfare ideals and people with unmet needs, NGOs are often 
trusted by broader segments of society than states.207 This makes them effective in the 
use of advocacy and operational means for the achievement of social benefit. Anti-
trafficking NGOs can work with states to develop legislation, spread human rights ideas, 
and gather attention of lawmakers while simultaneously assisting those ‘dormant’ 
members of civil society with the greatest need of help. Once again, this combination of 
insider and outsider activities allows NGOs to reach the greatest number of people and 
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form an ideological bridge between policymakers and actual victims, without the use of 
law enforcement or border controls.208 
 In the Council of Europe Convention on Action against Trafficking in Human 
Beings (discussed in Chapter 3), Article 5 states “Measures established in accordance 
with this article shall involve, where appropriate, non-governmental organisations, other 
relevant organisations and other elements of civil society committed to the prevention of 
trafficking in human beings and victim protection or assistance.”209 This Convention 
acknowledges the necessary role of NGOs in the fight against THB and asks signatories 
to work with these organizations whenever possible. This is made even clearer in Article 
27: 
“Each Party shall ensure, by means of legislative or other measures, in 
accordance with the conditions provided for by its internal law, to any 
group, foundation, association or non-governmental organization which 
aims at fighting trafficking in human beings or protection of human rights, 
the possibility to assist and/or support the victim with his or her consent 
during criminal proceedings concerning the offence established in 
accordance with Article 18 of this Convention.”210 
 
Once again, the writers of the Convention realize that the state apparatus does not 
necessarily serve as the best instrument for victim care and therefore, aim to ensure that 
third-parties take care of the human security aspect of human trafficking. Although such a 
view is reasonable and arguably correct, it may continue to deter the interest of 
governments in developing their own human rights mindset. However, for the purpose of 
                                                
208 For example, NGOs and policymakers can team up to create economic and social systems that will 
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209 “Council of Europe Convention on Action against Trafficking in Human Beings,” Council of Europe, 16 
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210 “Council of Europe Convention on Action against Trafficking in Human Beings,” 10. 
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concluding this thesis, focus will be placed on the potential long-term role of NGOs in 
the battle against THB in Poland. 
 Created in 2004, the Polish Team on Prevention and the Fight Against Trafficking 
in Human Beings includes seats for the representatives of three Polish NGOs related to 
THB: La Strada Foundation, Caritas – Poland, and Nobody’s Children Foundation. In 
order to understand the possible contribution of these NGOs to anti-trafficking efforts in 
the country, it is first necessary to understand their current work in the field. First off, 
Fundacja Dcieci Niczyje (Nobody’s Children Foundation) was founded in 1991 for the 
purposes of protecting children from abuse and helping abused children and their 
caregivers through psychological, medical, and legal assistance. Likewise, the 
Foundation runs a program that cares for the needs of trafficked and/or unaccompanied 
foreign children. The principle goal of this latter program is to prevent child trafficking 
by raising the knowledge and awareness of professionals who may potentially come into 
contact with such children. Yet it also strives to develop child identification and 
assistance systems that will be effective and based in a respect for human rights. All of 
this is pursued through means such as publications, training events, lobbying, research, 
and assessment.211 Although the Foundation was not created with the explicit intention to 
oppose the new forces of child trafficking, it has recognized the seriousness of the new 
issue and made arrangements to confront it. Similarly, Caritas – Poland was created in 
2004 to serve the needs of Poland’s poor and disadvantaged; yet as human trafficking 
emerged as a significant issue, the NGO began to run programs for countering social 
exclusion, including care centers for victims of forced prostitution and services that 
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enable migrants and refugees to integrate into Polish society.212 Caritas – Poland also 
runs programs for women searching for legal work abroad, especially in Germany. 
 However, the leading NGO concerned with human trafficking in Poland is the La 
Strada Foundation. Established in 1995, La Strada International began as a collaboration 
between NGOs in the Netherlands, Poland, and the Czech Republic and has slowly 
grown into a unique combination of national direct assistance branches and an 
international advocacy group. Concerned with spreading accurate information, the 
website of the international headquarters stresses facts such as “trafficking does not only 
concern women and is not limited to the sex industry.”213 A published flyer also states, 
“Although trafficking in human beings is recognized as a gross violation of human rights, 
current national and international anti-trafficking policies are instruments to fight 
organized crime and do not effectively address the root causes of trafficking nor do they 
deal with the human rights violations that trafficking causes.”214 Throughout the website, 
the mission of the international NGO is clear: to influence the narrow-minded legislation 
of states through a human security example that focuses on active victim care. 
Unfortunately, although the goals of the organization are noble, they often remain 
unfulfilled within the Polish branch. 
 As written on the Polish NGO’s website, “The La Strada Program seeks to make 
the issue of traffic of women visible and to influence the authorities and public opinion to 
address the topic from a human rights perspective. The program also seeks to refer 
victims to support networks and to educate women and girls against potential dangers of 
                                                
212 “Caritas Polska,” Cartias Internationalis, <http://www.caritas.org/worldmap/europe/poland.html>. 
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trafficking.” Here is the first glaring problem: although a human security strategy is 
embraced, its application is clearly limited to the female gender. In fact, when describing 
the nature of human trafficking in Poland, the organization only emphasizes the 
disproportionate effect of transitional economic depressions on women and claims that in 
the early 1990s “renewed gender discrimination infiltrated state institutions and the labor 
market,” resulting in a reserve army of feminine labor in Eastern Europe.215 Although 
such information may certainly be true and may explain the increased number of 
trafficked women into the West, it ignores the issue of trafficking in men and children, 
and likewise forgets about trafficking for purposes other than sexual exploitation. In fact, 
many sources complain, “Poland actually has no such system for providing assistance to 
forced labor victims…”216 Nobody’s Children Foundation focuses on trafficked children 
and youth, Caritas – Poland stresses help for victims of forced prostitution (essentially 
women), and La Strada – the only NGO completely dedicated to anti-trafficking efforts – 
has also chosen to place its attention on trafficked women. As such, the wise words of La 
Strada International have been widely ignored within the Polish non-governmental 
organization system. 
 Regardless of its gender-biased activities, La Strada carries out a great deal of 
necessary work. Functioning under a tripartite campaign structure, it covers the areas of 
(1) press campaigns and lobbying, (2) prevention and education campaigns, and (3) social 
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assistance campaigns. In the first instance, La Strada conducts many “press interviews 
and conferences, participates in seminars and international conventions, and develops 
practical training sessions for professionals who confront trafficking in Poland.”217 In this 
manner, La Strada engages in the advocacy aspect of NGO work, operating as an insider 
in the world of politics and influencing political actions and initiatives. In the second 
category, the NGO addresses potential victims through mass information distribution and 
school visits. It also runs a telephone hotline, offering advice and information to those 
considering migration.218 Last but not least, in the third category, La Strada targets 
present victims of trafficking through direct assistance, counseling, as well as referrals to 
legal and medical help. “La Strada may also provide support to women who wish to file 
charges against their traffickers.”219 Again the focus remains on women, but these 
grassroots prevention activities remain important due to their personal approach and 
target audience methods. In fact, the constant emphasis on informing Polish citizens 
considering migration may explain the recent decreases in Polish victims of human 
trafficking as explored in Chapter 2. 
 Yet La Strada does not solely focus on Polish citizens contemplating the 
possibility of work abroad. In 2006, the Ministry of the Interior and Administration 
formed the concept for a Support and Protection Programme for Victims of Trafficking in 
Human Beings; a year later, the La Strada Foundation won tender for its 
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implementation.220 According to the Ministry, the main objective of this program is to 
provide all trafficking victims with information, decent and safe conditions, and the 
possibility of advice and support at all stages of their crisis situation. Under the auspices 
of this program, La Strada also won an open competition in 2009 in order to appoint and 
operate the National Consulting and Intervention Centre for Victims of Trafficking.221 
The Centre – in conjunction with Program IRIS, developed in 2006 to offer Polish 
nationals a full program of support – offers assistance to victims or witnesses of 
trafficking, whether they are Polish citizens forced to work abroad or foreigners 
trafficked into Poland. As part of this goal, the Centre helps foreign victims legalize their 
stays and/or organizes their return home.222 It also hires employees and volunteers willing 
to accompany victims to meetings with police and prosecutors and runs a shelter for 
victims, which provides safe accommodation, food, and clothing. Last but not least, the 
Centre also runs a 24-hour helpline for victims and witnesses of trafficking. The Centre 
claims that each of these means of assistance secure basic living necessitates for victims 
and “build trust in regards to law enforcement and judicial bodies.”223 As such, human 
security methods are used in the hope of achieving state security objectives. Although 
Chapter 3 demonstrated that this had not been entirely effective in the past two years, it is 
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likely that the new definition of human trafficking in the Penal Code will begin to create 
positive changes.224 As traffickers recognize that victims in Poland no longer lack social 
and legal protection, their use of threats will lose in efficacy and they may choose to 
avoid the country altogether. In this way, a Polish NGO may finally act as a successful 
bridge between civil society and the state, resulting in the decreased occurrence of THB 
in the country. 
 Although Nobody’s Children, Caritas – Poland, and La Strada are the only NGOs 
represented on the Polish Team on Prevention and the Fight Against Trafficking in 
Human Beings, one other organization remains consistently active in anti-trafficking 
efforts throughout Poland: namely, the Polish branch of the International Organization for 
Migration (IOM). Supporting the humane treatment of migrants, the organization is best 
known for its public awareness campaigns. For example, “Human Trafficking Knows No 
Limits” is a mobile exhibition of pictures and advice organized by IOM, the Ministry of 
the Interior and Administration, and the U.S. Embassy in Poland. First presented in late 
2008, the mobile was taken to various locations around the country, including seven 
central train stations. Likewise, it was exhibited at relevant schools and academies and 
placed in the Warsaw train station during 2009. Finally, the gallery was also displayed in 
nine Ukrainian train stations and a short video summary was played on screens in select 
train wagons.225 In this way, IOM aim to target future professionals, possible Polish 
victims, and potential migrants coming from Poland’s largest source country. Similarly, 
the organization teamed up with Poland’s MTV, VH1, and Comedy Central to create an 
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ongoing campaign on popular television networks. A thirty-second commercial now asks 
people to research employment locations abroad before leaving for their unknown 
destination and also refers viewers to an informational blog.226 Once again, such bottom-
up prevention efforts are likely to be more effective than laws or border controls. By 
placing images and information in places scene by many cross-border travelers, IOM is 
likely to reach the greatest amount of people at the most personal level possible. 
 The International Organization for Migration also undertakes the popular NGO 
activity of assessment. Most recently, it conducted a February 2010 door-to-door survey 
of 1005 Poles in the attempt to determine Polish knowledge of human trafficking. An 
article published by the British Embassy of Warsaw – the survey’s chief sponsor – 
concludes that Polish knowledge of THB exists only on a surface level and that ignorance 
is especially rampant in the area of safe practices when searching for work abroad.227 
Furthermore, certain details of the survey reveal important facts regarding the Polish 
human trafficking situation. For example, interviewed Poles strongly linked human 
trafficking with prostitution, slavery or organ trade, whereas forced labor and begging 
were mentioned far less frequently.228 This is reflective of the attitudes of many 
policymakers and NGOs in Poland; thus, without strong programs and campaigns 
targeting victims of forced labor, it is clear that Polish citizens will remain ignorant and 
vulnerable to this ongoing problem. However, even more important to note is the 
following: “Poles believe that prevention of [THB] is primarily a responsibility of the 
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police (73%). A half of those polled think that this problem should be handled by 
governmental agencies. 36% of the respondents mention NGOs, 28% point to the media, 
19% to local governments and 14% think it should be handled by…religious 
organizations.”229 Yet when asked who should help victims of trafficking, an increased 
number of Poles mentioned NGOs (49%). This change in answers demonstrates the fact 
that most people do not associate human trafficking prevention with the human security 
approach of protecting victims; rather, trafficking prevention is seen as a matter of state 
security. However, if NGOs expanded their activities and diminished the social exclusion 
of victims (as mentioned above), it is likely that such an attitude would fade away. In all, 
it is evident that Poles’ attitudes toward trafficking are an accurate indicator of the current 
policies and attitudes of the Polish government. 
 Although NGOs with a focus on human rights do exist in Poland, a large number 
of problems remain. First and foremost is the issue of ignoring forced labor victims; 
Lasocik and Wieczorek write, “there is only one organization in Poland providing 
assistance to victims of trafficking in human beings, but it is mainly oriented at helping 
the victims of trafficking in human beings for sexual abuse.”230 Thus, there is an urgent 
need to expand the orientation of available victim assistance provided by La Strada as 
well as a general need to create more care centers. The second problem goes hand in hand 
with this latter necessity; the activities of La Strada’s victim assistance are limited to 
Warsaw, an inconvenient location for many of the forced labor victims found in 
agricultural fields and rural construction or mining sites. Thus resources should be 
funneled into the creation of branches of care throughout Poland’s territory. This leads to 
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the third point: “In the opinion of NGO experts, and those representing the labour and 
social policy area, the amounts allocated for [victim assistance] from the State budget are 
insufficient.”231 For example, in 2009, the Ministry of the Interior and Administration 
earmarked PLN 950,000 for this purpose and the Ministry of Labour and Social Policy 
allocated PLN 120,000 for staff training in victim and witness treatment.232 Altogether, 
this amounted to approximately 388,780 USD of aid, a number that seems absurdly small 
and ineffective for such an important policy initiative. Such a sum will barely suffice in 
the implementation of current plans; expansion of services and centers would require 
much larger degrees of funding. 
 Lastly, according to Filip Jasinski of the European University Insitute, there are 
two other NGO-related problems in Poland: (1) “perceived coordination of the anti-THB 
activities between different national and international, governmental and NGO actors is 
seen as disappointing” and (2) “there truly exists a competition between various 
international and national anti-trafficking actors.”233 After researching the four dominant 
trafficking-related NGOs in Poland, it is extremely clear that such an observation is 
correct; there is little or no cooperation between these organization. Even La Strada 
points to this fact: 
“…The attempt to halt trafficking has been divided between organizations 
each of which works with a different aspect and from a different 
perspective. This leads to a fragmented line of battle against an 
increasingly well-organized and entrenched phenomenon. The Church 
sees victims as corrupted girls. Police view them as criminals or illegal 
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migrants. Judges want their testimony. The media want a sensational 
story. Government is afraid they will become a social liability. Traffickers 
want to make a profit off them. La Strada, as a non-governmental 
organization, understands them as young women robbed of their human 
rights and puts their immediate needs first, often dealing with the 
symptoms rather than the causes of trafficking.”234 
 
In this case, La Strada is criticizing the lack of cooperation and acknowledging its 
negative effects, but ironically, it achieves this through disapproval of its counterparts. 
For example, by condemning the Church, La Strada ignores the good work of Caritas – 
Poland in the field of migrants and sexually abused women. When attacking the media, 
the NGO forgets that the press is an important vehicle for spreading information to a 
scattered audience. However, if such criticisms were forgotten and an actual attitude of 
cooperation and respect were adopted, it is likely that significant progress could be made 
quickly and successfully. 
 Overall, it has been the goal of this thesis to analyze current anti-trafficking 
methods in the European Union, and specifically Poland, after the Palermo Protocols 
shifted universal focus on the prosecution of criminals, protection of victims, and 
prevention of the crime. Chapter 1 examined the EU’s fixation with border securitization 
and Poland’s faithful reaction to these demands for migration control. Referencing the 
desperate situation of many of the world’s poor, the chapter also emphasizes the fact that 
stopping traffickers and creating disincentives for migration through border controls is an 
unrealistic goal. The very nature of trafficking demonstrates that migrants are willing to 
take extraordinary measures for the possibility of a better life abroad; stringent 
immigration policies will only put them in a position of greater vulnerability. Next, 
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Chapter 2 discussed the trends of trafficking throughout the EU and Poland and stressed 
that criminals are increasingly resorting to more hidden and unknown methods of 
trafficking as a means of evading law enforcement. Most importantly, this chapter 
highlights the disproportionate amount of government attention currently placed on sex 
trafficking and argues that ignorant policies and discussions reflect a fundamental lack of 
understanding. Last but not least, Chapter 3 predominantly explores the difficulties in 
criminalizing human trafficking in Poland and recognizes that effective prosecution is a 
key step in the fight against inhumane criminals. Until these persecutors are given 
adequate punishment, advancements in victim protection will be stifled. Thus, the chapter 
ends on a hopeful note, believing that the new changes to Poland’s criminal code will 
allow the country to move forward in victim care and protection. 
 Throughout these chapters, however, it became increasingly clear that the three Ps 
of human trafficking do not sufficiently address the root causes of this terrible 
occurrence. Suggested multiple times throughout this thesis, it is clear that the forces of 
globalization have pushed for national borders that are open to the “international 
exchange of capital and goods, but also to increasing labor migration.”235 For example, as 
multinational corporations and structural adjustment policies infiltrate the territories of 
developing countries, millions of low-skilled workers are thrust into situations of low-
paying jobs, social benefit cuts, and atmospheres that propagate Western values of 
consumerism and capitalism. For some, such contradictory combinations form a strong 
incentive for migration. More generally, it is an undeniable reality that the wealth gap 
between rich and poor countries and communities continues to widen, producing a steady 
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flow of survival migrants236 looking for a chance at new life in the West, particularly 
Europe. This migration trend is further aggravated by pull factors such as the aging 
populations, labor shortages, and increased tax burdens on workers present within most 
of the wealthy countries, which are becoming increasingly dependent on migrants to fill 
labor gaps (as is the case in Poland). Yet the poor’s desperate need to migrate and the 
wealthy nations’ lack of labor are met with today’s devotion to strict border controls, 
“render[ing] these migrants highly vulnerable to trafficking.”237 
 Janie Chuang describes governments’ resistance to freer immigration flows as the 
result of citizens’ mistaken concerns about the possible negative impacts “on 
employment, national security, welfare systems, and national identity.”238 She goes on to 
argue that lawmakers prefer to stay away from this controversial issue of confronting 
xenophobic reactions for the purpose of their own political advantage. Thus, the focus of 
governmental anti-trafficking efforts remains on restrictive migration controls and 
criminal justice issues rather than on long-term issues such as labor migration problems, 
which require more time and money.  Similarly, by emphasizing the problem of sex 
trafficking and avoiding discussion of forced labor, it is likely that states are simply 
further denying the major obstacle of modern labor migration patterns. All of this points 
to the fact that, although maintaining state security and possessing extensive monetary 
resources, governments are inherently faced with a conflict of interest and therefore, ill 
equipped for an effective and extended fight against trafficking in human beings.  
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 However, the inadequacy of states in this battle does not imply that non-
governmental organizations are, by default, the best policymakers on the trafficking 
issue. As demonstrated throughout this conclusion, the few NGOs of Poland have many 
faults including narrow priorities, a lack of cooperation, and very limited resources. 
Likewise, operational activities inevitably give attention to informational campaigns and 
victim assistance, yet none of these preventative and protective measures deal with the 
forces of labor migration; people helped by these NGOs “are still left facing the 
socioeconomic conditions that rendered them vulnerable to abuse in the first instance.”239 
But although there are many barriers to the proper functioning of anti-trafficking NGOs 
in Poland, these organizations still play an important role and serve as a constant 
reminder of the human security perspective that is so necessary to the fight against THB. 
Firstly, NGOs go beyond the minimal requirements of the Palermo Protocols on 
Trafficking and Smuggling, providing safety and care to victims who, for many years, 
fell between the cracks of anti-trafficking legislation. Secondly, by maintaining an 
identity separate from the state, NGOs are in a position to advocate human rights 
approaches to trafficking without any conflict of interest and with greater potential of 
gaining citizens’ trust. This image of independence also gives NGOs the unique ability to 
assess the effectiveness of governments’ anti-trafficking policies. Lastly, the issue-driven 
nature of NGOs makes them the ideal choice for long-term expert research and project 
development. Knowing that targeting root causes such as globalization and the push for 
labor migration will require creative, long-term strategic thinking, this last factor may 
prove to be the most important attribute of anti-trafficking NGOs. 
                                                
239 Chuang, 139. 
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 As a new member of the European Union, Poland was obligated to reinforce its 
borders with the East and act appropriately as the gateway to ‘Fortress Europe’. In this 
process, the citizens of Poland’s direct neighbors – Ukraine, Belarus, and the Russian 
Federation – were especially struck with a sense of social isolation and rejection. Now 
seen as persona non grata throughout Europe, these men and women continue to struggle 
between rising unemployment at home and the desire for cheap labor in the West; 
inevitably, many still realize that illicit means of travel are their only hope for a better 
life. Human trafficking has flourished in this area of the world and it is abundantly clear 
that even greater border controls and police activity will make little difference in the face 
of such migration pressures. Instead, gateway countries such as Poland must embrace a 
culture of human rights through improved criminal prosecution and victim assistance. 
Such an approach will likely deter the willingness of traffickers to risk entrance into the 
country and will likewise encourage victims to stand up to their persecutors and seek help 
without fear. In this manner, trafficking in human beings will lose its high profitability 
and possibly decrease in occurrence. Yet, without strategies targeting the socioeconomic 
root causes of trafficking and opening borders to greater flows of migration, extensive 
change will be impossible. For this reason, NGOs should dedicate their time to 
comprehensive research and assessment of this situation and – by gaining public trust 
through continued good works – attempt to create a fundamental change in citizen’s 
attitudes toward immigration. Only after this potential alteration of beliefs will states 
finally have the opportunity to answer the cries of the poor migrant and effectively end 
this terrible crime against humanity. 
